Saturday, September 1, 2012

Kriegler’s Hlophe Attacks Built On Demonstrably Misleading Assertions - Paul Ngobeni



Kriegler’s Freedom Under Law (FUL), a reactionary political outfit masquerading as an angel of constitutional light, has launched another unwarranted attack on Judge President Hlophe.   In his press release of 22 August, 2012, Kriegler expressed surprise that Radebe, the Minister of Justice “has reportedly made known that, irrespective of the outcome, the State - i.e. the South African taxpayer - is to stand good for the legal costs incurred by Judge President MJ Hlophe in the proceedings arising from the complaint against him by the justices of the Constitutional Court (CC) and, presumably, from the associated complaint by FUL.” Further, Kriegler asserted that the Minister has committed the “public purse to paying  Judge Hlophe's costs even if he is found guilty of the grave charges still outstanding against him” Without any creditable citation to legal authority, Kriegler simply labels the decision of the Minister as “legally and ethically indefensible.”  He asseverates that “there has never been a suggestion that the judge president of the Cape court was acting in the course of his duties when on his own admission he raised with two justices in their offices in Braamfontein the politically sensitive Zuma/Thint cases they were considering at the time.” This is misleading demagoguery of the worst kind - the processing and investigation of judicial misconduct complaints follow similar route irrespective of whether the alleged misconduct occurred on or off the bench. 

In a blatant display of intellectual dishonesty, Kriegler alleges that the “minister's alleged reliance on the constitutional importance of the complaints is equally unsound. No constitutional issue has ever been raised in the two complaints against the judge. The first turns on his credibility, the second on the impropriety of the scandalous allegations about his colleagues to which he resorted in his defence. The constitutionality of the JSC's (mis)conduct was never in issue in the complaints against the judge and has in any event long since been determined. The fundamental issue has at all times been Judge Hlophe's fitness for judicial office.”That is pure hogwash - a judicial misconduct investigation and possible impeachment all raise constitutional issues.

Unfortunately Kriegler has long revealed himself as a person who has cast aside any pretence of objectivity and is blinded by his obsessive pursuit of a political agenda against Judge President Hlophe.  One must contrast Kriegler’s solicitous stance towards the rights of white apartheid politicians with his latter day flagrant disregard of the rights of black public servants.  Consider the case of  S v Mulder  (1980 1 SA 113 (T) 121F-121G) where a  due process violation arose under the Commissions Act 8 of 1947 in the so-called Erasmus Inquiry conducted in the late 1970s. The previous apartheid Minister, Dr Connie Mulder, had been summoned to appear before the one man commission. It was revealed that Mulder, along with Prime Minister Vorster, had planned to use defence force funds to stage an apartheid propaganda campaign. This plan included offering bribes to international news agencies and purchasing a Washington newspaper. Vorster also misappropriated funds by financing The Citizen, the only English newspaper supportive of the NP and their apartheid policy.  On advice of his counsel, one Johann Kriegler SC, Mulder declined to testify. He was charged with declining to testify in terms of the Commissions Act. The Supreme Court quashed the conviction of  Mulder on the ground that the mandate of the Commission was so widely and vaguely defined that he was legally justified in declining to testify.  In effect, the summons to testify was held to have been invalid in the light of the mandate given to the Commission.  Most important, the court also agreed that the due process rights of citizens deserved to be safeguarded during commissions of inquiry and that the recommendations of a commission of inquiry may in “ ʼn los sin“ (“in a loose sense”) have an adverse effect on citizens. See also; Bongoza v Minister of Correctional Services 2002(6) SA 330(THC). 

It is revealing that former apartheid Judge Kriegler who, as an apartheid advocate used his legal talents to assist fellow whites during apartheid was amongst those who argued that Simelane should not be entitled to the same procedural due process rights recognized for corrupt apartheid functionaries.  His organization FUL, which is aided and abetted by senior white advocates and few black puppets has been in the forefront of those opposing Simelane’s appointment on the basis of adverse remarks from the Ginwala Enquiry whose terms of reference did not include the investigation of Simelane.  It is equally revealing that during the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) hearings, most whites followed Kriegler’s strategy and stonewalled the Commission on various procedural grounds including violation of the rules of natural justice.  See, Truth and Reconciliation Commission v. Du Preez and Another, 1996 (3) SA 997 (1996) (CPD) overruled in Du Preez and Another v. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1997 (3) SA 204 (Appellate Division), which came to conflicting interpretations regarding the meaning of “fairness” in regard to persons identified by victims as perpetrators of gross human rights violations against them.

It is therefore not surprising that Kriegler’s  vituperative propaganda against Judge President Hlophe has left him on the verge of political madness – he is undermining the constitution by fulminating about the evils of the state providing cover for the legal expenses of accused judges even though the Constitution makes the provisions of said funding mandatory.   I would go further and suggest that Kriegler has been an unprincipled and obsequious apologist for white hegemony and power while at the same time misinterpreting the Constitution to serve his political agenda when it comes to the rights of blacks.   I now address the merits of his rambling press release to expose the intellectual claptrap he espouses in his message.

Kriegler claims that the “minister's alleged reliance on the constitutional importance of the complaints is equally unsound. No constitutional issue has ever been raised in the two complaints against the judge.”  In his myopic view, a constitutional issue must be raised within the four corners of the misconduct complaint or else it is to be discounted.   That is an absurdity – a judicial misconduct complaint is at all times a constitutional issue and it is governed directly by the Constitution. Under our constitutional scheme, specifically Section 177 of the Constitution, which governs the impeachment of judges, a judge may be removed only when two conditions have been satisfied. Fist, the JSC must, after investigation, pronounce that the judge is guilty either of gross incompetence or gross misconduct or is suffering from incapacity.  Second, at least two-thirds of the National Assembly resolves to remove that judge. Once these two processes have taken place, the President of South Africa is obliged to remove the judge.  

R      Recently, the SCA in Judicial Service Commission v Premier, Western Cape  (537/10) [2011] Z  ASCA 53 (31 March 2011) stated the following regarding removal proceedings for our judges:

[17] It would have been possible for the drafters of the Constitution to have adopted a model where only judges could remove judges. In Israel, for example, the Basic Law on the Judiciary provides that judges may be removed upon the decision of the Court of Discipline which comprises only judges and judges retired on pension appointed by the President of the Supreme Court. Or a model could have been adopted where only the elected representatives of the people could do so. In the United States of America, a country very much aware of the proper separation of powers, the House of Representatives has the 'sole power' to impeach federal judges and the Senate has the 'sole power' to try all impeachments. The model ultimately chosen for our country was one somewhere between the two. The first stage is a decision taken predominantly by judges and lawyers. The second is a decision by the National Assembly by a two-thirds majority. (Emphasis added).

Kriegler falsely states that it “should also be noted that the judge president's costs over more than four years were incurred while he, retaining his office and its benefits, vigorously - and thus far successfully - fought to put off the final determination of the truth of his conversation with the two justices. In the circumstances it is unconscionable that such costs are to be borne by the citizenry.”  To the chagrin of the likes of Kriegler, members of the judiciary, even those facing misconduct complaints, must look beyond their personal feelings and stand up for the courts as an institution. There rests upon every judge affected a sacred duty to withstand any attempt, directly or indirectly in contravention of the Constitution, to diminish this compensation, not for his private benefit-but in the interest of preserving unimpaired an essential safeguard adopted as a continuing guaranty of an independent judicial administration for the benefit of the whole people.  Nothing in the Constitution suggests that the JSC investigation and ultimate impeachment process must come cheap or that the taxpayers must be shielded from the costs at the expense of judges facing judicial misconduct investigations.  Nothing in the Constitution suggests that the JSC investigation process (first stage) may be used to impose penalties (financial or otherwise) or in any manner to exert undue pressure on a judge to facilitate his resignation.  

To the contrary, the Constitution’s drafters deliberately sought to design a cumbersome or almost unwieldy system that protected judges from politically inspired threats of removal.  Cost effectiveness and efficiency was not a primary goal of the Constitution's judicial removal mechanism.  A speedy, inexpensive and efficient removal mechanism might not have protected judicial independence nearly as well as the awkward and expensive procedures now in place.  Kriegler’s assertion that it “should also be noted that the judge president's costs over more than four years were incurred while he, retaining his office and its benefits, vigorously - and thus far successfully - fought to put off the final determination of the truth of his conversation with the two justices’ is false and malicious. The most recent appeals by Zille and FUL involved challenges to the JSC conduct of its proceedings and that had nothing to do with a fight by JP Hlophe.  Equally absurd is FUL’s statement implying that in the “the circumstances it is unconscionable that such costs are to be borne by the citizenry.”   Truth be told, there is no provision for payments of costs by the accused judge either in the JSC or in the National Assembly should the matter get that far.  Kriegler’s statement is clearly cheap political grandstanding and finds no support in the Constitution.

Kriegler dodges a pivotal question to be answered by all conscientious scholars and civic-minded citizens, that is, whether the State is legally obligated to pay judges’ legal costs during JSC or impeachment proceedings. The answer is surprisingly in the affirmative.  Given that a judge enjoys protection under Section 176(3) of the Constitution which provides that the 'salaries, allowances and benefits of judges may not be reduced' would a requirement that a judge pay for his legal costs during JSC or impeachment proceedings directly or indirectly violate this provision of the Constitution?  Clearly, requiring a judge to dip into his own pocket to personally fund the costs of legal defence each time a misconduct complaint is filed against him results in a reduction of his salary or benefits directly.      It goes without saying that the argument that a judge must be shielded from financial burdens of litigation applicable to other public servants is counterintuitive. It is fundamental to our system of justice that no one is above the law and that judges as citizens are not entitled to special treatment in the enforcement of their rights.  Yet these principles are not absolute. For example, Section 176(3) recognizes as legitimate a distinction between judges whose “benefits” may not be reduced and the ordinary public servants who may suffer pay cuts or even job losses due to budgetary and other reasons.  This constitutionalized special treatment for judges may offend our sense of justice, but they are thought to serve a purpose higher than the exigencies of a particular case. Many decades of constitutional adjudication and experiences of other countries should have taught us that intuition is no substitute for legal reasoning and results that at first appear counterintuitive, perhaps even offensive, may nevertheless be compelled. 

The independence of judges must be guaranteed by ensuring that the conditions of their appointment, compensation and dismissal are free from executive interference or control. In those situations, where there is an allegation of misconduct on the part of a judge, the procedure for removal or suspension must itself be impartial and conform to the procedures of the court. Kriegler’s position that Hlophe, or any judge facing allegations of judicial misconduct must bargain with the Justice Minister Radebe for the right to obtain “cover” for legal expenses and acceptance of “liability” routinely granted to state officials is at odds with our constitution and international good practice.  In Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3. (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “P.E.I. Reference”], the Canadian Supreme Court noted that “under no circumstances is it permissible for the judiciary -- not only collectively through representative organizations, but also as individuals -- to engage in negotiations over remuneration with the executive or representatives of the legislature. Any such negotiations would be fundamentally at odds with judicial independence.Id., at para. 134. It is a truism that judges, although they must ultimately be paid from public monies, are not civil servants. Civil servants are part of the executive; judges, by definition, are independent of the executive. The three core characteristics of judicial independence – security of tenure, financial security, and administrative independence – are a reflection of that fundamental distinction, because they provide a range of protections to members of the judiciary to which civil servants are not constitutionally entitled. 

As a corollary, given that the purpose of Section 176(3) is to maintain the separation of powers and promote true judicial independence; given that the Clause ensures judicial integrity both in perception and in action, and given that this clause is to be construed, not as a private grant, but as a limitation imposed in the public interest  can an individual judge validly waive the provisions of Section 176(3) through a reimbursement agreement with the executive as both Kriegler and Radebe imply?   There is a rich academic debate in South Africa and other advanced democracies about the waiver of certain rights, including those enshrined in the Constitution.  There are on the one hand, most fundamental rights, including equality, which are conferred primarily for the benefit of individuals, and can, therefore, be waived.  The better reasoned view with regard to Section 176(3) is that it is not to benefit the judges but, like the clause in respect of tenure, to maintain the separation of powers and promote true judicial independence. Because the Clause ensures judicial integrity both in perception and in action, there are important public policy considerations involved and as such the provisions of this clause cannot be waived by an individual judge. 

To say that Kriegler is wrong does not mean I endorse Minister Radebe’s unconstitutional application of the standard reimbursement agreement to judges. The agreement itself raises even more disturbing questions – it requires a forfeiture of cover based on the outcome of the case and allows the executive to require a written agreement from JP Hlophe as a condition of providing “liability” cover even before the outcome of the JSC and potential impeachment proceedings is known?  The agreement is itself perverse in that it damages the credibility of the judge as a witness or even as a litigant.  He becomes financially interested in a case as he potentially stands to lose millions if the case goes against him.  The purported reimbursement agreement can forever be used as an in terrorem stick by the executive to force the judge to tow the line.  The state is the litigant in every criminal case and potentially every criminal defendant can successfully launch a recusal application against any judge who is subject to the type of reimbursement agreement Radebe is relying on. The grounds for such recusal application would be that the judge is not truly independent as the executive (the Minister) exercises a power over the judge’s subsistence and this amounts to a power over the judge’s will or independence.   The Minister’s insidious power of control over the public purse and availability of funds for individual judges is damaging to both the actuality and appearance of judicial independence.   Depending on how congenial the judge may be, the  Minister wields the unbridled  power to make a debt worth millions evaporate.  On the other hand if the judge involved proves to be too obstreperous for the minister’s liking, the latter can let that stubbornly independent judge drown in his own massive debt as punishment.    Even the threat of using the Minister’s power to make the judge individually liable is enough to force any judge to cave in to the executive’s demands.



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