All
right thinking people must be perturbed by the Farlam Commission’s handling of
the Marikana tragedy investigation. Appointed by the President in terms
of section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution, the Commission’s mandate is to
investigate matters of “public, national and international concern” arising out
of the tragic incidents at the Lonmin Mine which led to the deaths of
approximately 44 people, more than 70 persons being injured, approximately 250
people being arrested. Given its importance domestically and
internationally, especially for investors in the ailing mining industry, one
would expect that parties before it, particularly government, would
conscientiously cooperate and avoid gamesmanship and shenanigans eviscerating
the truth-seeking attributes of the Commission. It's a crying shame that
the Justice Department has repeatedly shirked its responsibility for the legal
fees associated with the presentation of the version of the victims at the
Commission. It is equally damnable and disconcerting that the supposedly independent Legal
Aid also refused funding. Even more disgraceful is that the victims and
their families with meager financial resources have been forced by the
arrogance and insouciance of the officials to approach the Court for
appropriate relief. This follows a familiar pattern of the government officials
arrogantly acting in breach of constitutional imperatives and with impunity,
and not being held accountable mostly because of inability, unwillingness or
political reasons.
Sadly,
Judge Farlam is squarely to blame for the proceedings being bogged down in
litigation and procedural side-shows instead of being focused, speedy and
efficient for the sake of our society, our judiciary and for benefit of all
involved. Farlam dropped the ball from the very onset when he appears to
have swallowed, hook, line and sinker, the constitutionally disingenuous
argument by the Department that it is permissible to treat the families as
illegitimate step-children in a process investigating the murder of loved
ones. Justice spokesman Mhaga expressed this misguided attitude when he
said there was no legal basis for paying the costs for families who wished to
attend the commission hearings “on state expense”. In Mhaga’s view, the
victims’ families are mere free passengers and any expenses paid by government
for them are mere gratuity and not an entitlement. He claims: “The
attendance of the first session of the commission was mainly based on
humanitarian basis as it is important that they understand the primary purpose
of the inquiry.”
Without
a firm rebuke from Judge Farlam, the state shamelessly engaged in evasive tactics,
downright stalling and stonewalling to refuse paying legal expenses required
for the victims and families to participate in the hearings. Farlam
has been reduced to functioning as a bloodless automaton throughout the
process. Under his watch, the state uses the public purse to finance the
police officers implicated in the massacre and assure their witnesses of continued
financial support while denying the victims similar benefits.
Farlam
appears not to have interrogated three pivotal issues: whether the state is
constitutionally obligated to carry out an effective investigation into the
death of persons killed as a result of lethal force by police; whether the
victims’ families have any entrenched constitutional rights to participate in
the proceedings before a commission appointed under section 84(2)(f); and
assuming they have such rights, as opposed to unilateral expectation of a
voluntary gratuity from the state, what are the exact contours of their
entitlement to financial assistance given that the SA Police Service is getting
state funding for legal representation.
The
Concourt’s Makwanyane judgment,
which drew from the capital punishment jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) and other democracies, outlawed the death penalty as
inconsistent with the constitutional guarantees of right to life as well as the
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Since that decision, the
right to life has been interpreted by the ECHR to impose a procedural duty on
the State to conduct an effective investigation into any death occurring in
circumstances where the substantive obligations not to take life arbitrarily
and to protect life have (or may have) been breached by state agents. In McCann v. UK, the ECHR opined that failure to conduct an effective
investigation constitutes a violation of the right to life, notwithstanding
proof of compliance with the substantive obligations not to take life
arbitrarily and to protect life. Without such an obligation, the prohibition on
the unlawful or arbitrary taking of life is rendered largely meaningless.
Importantly, courts have recognized that family of the deceased must be
involved in the inquiry to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her
legitimate interests. In the UK, the obligation to ensure proper family
participation has been interpreted to mean that the family must be provided
with legal representation where it is likely to be necessary to ensure an
effective investigation. In R
(Amin) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] the court held
that: “The duty to investigate is partly one owed to the next of kin of the
deceased as representing the deceased: it is partly to others who may in
similar circumstances be vulnerable and whose lives may need to be protected. “ Further, it ruled that the family
must also be provided with relevant material and given the opportunity to
cross-examine witnesses. It is not clear how Farlam intends to ensure that the duty to investigate owed to the next of kin of the deceased and the injured victims is enforced.
The
Commission can only have legitimacy if it takes these admonitions to heart and,
in actuality and in appearance, meets the test of independence. In Edwards v United Kingdom, the Court
stated that absolute independence of persons responsible for and carrying out
the investigation from those implicated in the events is crucial for
independence. This means not only a lack of hierarchical or institutional
connection but also a practical independence. The adoption of an
over-deferential attitude to the executive or members of the security forces
invariably constitutes a serious if not fatal shortcoming in any
Commission.
Lest
we forget, the President’s power to appoint the Commission is an original
constitutional power he exercises alone as a head of state rather than as head
of the executive. Typically, the purpose behind most Commissions is the
restoration of public confidence and Commissions achieve that by educating the
public on why a particular tragedy or social problem occurred and by making
recommendations to improve the situation or to prevent a future occurrence.
Unlike the typical judicial role, the functions of commissions of inquiry are
to determine facts and to advise the president through recommendations.
But, as the Concourt stated in SARFU, the "President is bound neither to
accept the commission’s factual findings nor is he or she bound to follow its
recommendations." It is no exaggeration to state that
the credibility of the Commission and its report and their acceptance by the
generality of the public are indispensable for restoration of investor
confidence in our mining industry which is the mainstay of our economy.
Imporatntly, the Bill of Rights has added another twist to Commissions that Farlam fails to
appreciate. In light of the constitutional obligation to investigate a
massacre involving real victims, a presidentially appointed commission
operating under an apartheid-era statute can never suffice. Had Farlam
been alert, he would have proactively prevented the Commission’s processes from
being used in a manner that results in unconstitutional and unequal treatment
between the police officers and victims who are parties to the dispute.
Another principle overlooked by the Commission is “equality of arms.” It
requires each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his
case - including his evidence - under conditions that do not place him at a
substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent. Farlam, who has been given
wide latitude to manage the hearings, has failed to ensure adherence to this
principle. Instead of using the Commission’s vast and expansive powers to
avoid discrimination, disenfranchisement and unlawful treatment of the victims,
Farlam proved powerless. Under his watch the state has severely eviscerated
the truth-seeking attributes of the Commission. In the final analysis,
the credibility and integrity of the Commission rests squarely on Farlam’s
shoulders, something he is not free to fob off to a seemingly unembarassable
executive.
I
am supremely confident that Farlam has the wisdom and courage to make
amends. He can adopt panoply of prophylactic measures designed to ensure
fairness, efficiency and transparency of the propceedings. Managing the
inquiry into this massacre requires going far beyond the desultory debate about
privilege versus right when it comes to funding victims’ legal teams. At
the behest of the justice ministry, criminal prosecutions were placed on hold
and the public was told the Commission was designated as the vehicle for
unearthing the truth. Properly utilized, it will set in motion the wheels
of justice both in terms of criminal prosecutions and civil damages
claims. When it comes to investigating a massacre, we must jettison the
simplistic pre-constitutional view of commissions as nothing more than an
adjunct to the policy formation responsibility of the President.
With the stakes so high, a discredited report may revive the
titanic violent battles between the unions for dominance in the mining sector.
Victims who reposed their confidence in the Commission may walk away with an
abiding sense of betrayal and may forever rue their excruciating patience and
decision to give government a chance. The extant lack of financial
resources to mount further legal battles may also give way to exasperation and
total loss of confidence in our judiciary, an outcome too ghastly to
contemplate. Without confidence in the judicial system, people may resort
to self-help remedies and meet at high noon in the streets to do battle. Farlam’s
failure will definitely have a huge impact on the outcome of the seemingly
dormant debate within the jurisprudential community about whether judges
accepting executive appointments on commission compromise judicial independence
by cozying up to the executive or legitimizing farcical processes.