Saturday, November 20, 2021

President Zuma’s Tax Judgment – The Saga of Undisciplined and Incompetent Judiciary Continues

 

President Zuma’s Tax Judgment – The Saga of Undisciplined and Incompetent Judiciary Continues

            By : Paul Ngobeni

 

 

Make no mistake about it – Judge Norman Davis’s judgment on SARS duty to disclose President Zuma’s tax affairs is woefully flawed and exposes his incompetence as a judge. It evinces the tendency of some white activist judges to resort to their own policy preferences instead of faithfully following existing laws passed by a black majority Parliament, and their tendency to disregard established precedent and rules of evidence.  It is an unprecedented case where busy-bodies posing as journalists are given free reign and the written word of white reporters or book authors is taken as gospel truth. Judge Davis went so far as to ignore a binding Constitutional Court order on the very same issue involving the Zuma tax liability.

 

Judge Davis’ Jurisprudence and Background

 

Judge Davis, a white male, was appointed to the bench in January 2018 after previous unsuccessful attempts in 2015 and 2016.  He admitted he served in the Apartheid Airforce during the ultra-violent 1980s and actually stated in his 2016 interview that “he perceived, at the time, that the law was about protecting the country” and that he felt it correct at the time, although “it was unjust in how we went outside our borders and committed what we did”. 

 

During Davis’ 2017 interview, Western Cape Judge President John Hlophe asked him penetrating questions probing his views about racism. Hlophe JP asked Davis if racism still existed in the country and in the judiciary. If this was the case, Hlophe continued, then why? Tellingly, the racism denialist Davis responded: “I have never seen or experienced any racism” in the Gauteng High Court sitting in Pretoria. That response was a lie! Hlophe swiftly enquired whether Judge Mabel Jansen, who was involved in a highly publicised social media racism incident, had not sat on the Pretoria Bench, before her subsequent resignation? Davis sheepishly conceded that she did.  But Davis was clearly disassembling to cover up his own insouciance towards racism.  Just a few months before the interview, in April 2017, the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) had publicly announced that it decided that Pretoria High Court Judge Mabel Jansen must face a tribunal to investigate whether her statements on Facebook about race and black culture amounted to impeachable conduct. See, https://mg.co.za/article/2017-04-07-judge-mabel-jansen-to-face-impeachment-tribunal-over-facebook-comments/   But Davis claimed a mere five months later that he had seen nothing and heard nothing!

 

A month later in May 2017, Mabel Jansen resigned as a judge with immediate effect. https://mg.co.za/article/2017-05-04-mabel-jansen-resigns-as-judge/  The newspapers reported that: “Jansen has been unable to escape allegations of racism following a public discussion on Facebook in 2015 with filmmaker Gillian Schutte, where she said that 99% of criminal cases she heard were about “black fathers, uncles, brothers raping children as young as five”. She continued: “Want to read my files: rape, rape, rape, rape, rape, rape of minors by black family members. It is never-ending.” Id.

 

Incredibly, the sleep-walking Judge Davis claimed at his interview that he had “never seen or experienced any racism” in the Gauteng High Court sitting in Pretoria.  Later, Justice Minister Michael Masutha expressed his concern about the candidate’s “emphatic response to the existence or otherwise” of racism in the division. “Does it have to be displayed to you for it to exist?” asked Masutha. Davis said, “Perhaps I put her and her conduct out of my mind and did not remember it”. He then went into detail about the attempts he had made to meet, head-on, the opposition to transformation he had encountered in the legal profession while chairperson of the Pretoria Bar.

During the October 2016 interview Julius Malema asked Davis why he had agreed to conscription into the apartheid-era South African National defense Force rather than becoming a conscientious objector or “picking up an AK47” as Joe Slovo and others had done. Davis said “he perceived at the time that the law was about protecting the country” and that he felt it correct at the time, although “it was unjust in how we went outside our borders and committed what we did”.

 

Incredibly, the JSC still appointed this somnambulist jurist to the bench where he has continued to wreak havoc and serve as an unmitigated disaster.

 

 In April 2020, several lawyers and law firms who were until recently on the Road Accident Fund (RAF) panel of attorneys, filed a complaint of alleged misconduct with the Judicial Service Commission against Davis. See, https://www.iol.co.za/pretoria-news/lawyers-take-misconduct-gripe-against-judge-norman-davis-to-judicial-service-commission-47281711  They alleged that Davis presided over a case in which he was conflicted and biased and ruled against the complainants. The lawyers said in their complaint that what Judge Davis did not disclose, was that he “had more than one meeting with the fund, which was the respondent in this matter”. They added the judge also presided over several other similar matters which were placed on his roll for that week. The lawyers said it was only after he had issued his judgment against them, that the minutes of several meetings held a year ago with the RAF came to their attention, in which the future of the fund was discussed and where Judge Davis and other judges were present. They said according to the minutes, Judge Davis did at the time make negative reference to the panel of lawyers. The lawyers said Judge Davis should have disclosed these meetings before he heard their urgent application. “In our view he breached an elementary ethical duty as a judge when he failed to disclose that he attended a meeting with one party of the litigation.” They said in their opinion the judge was guilty of gross misconduct and his conduct amounted to a wilful or gross breach of the judicial conduct code. 

 

Hardly two months after the JSC complaint, the sleep-walking jurist and politician in judicial robes revealed his monumental judicial incompetence in a bizarre case dealing with the lockdown regulations at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic. The case was brought by Reyno de Beer and an organisation called Liberty Fighters Network, during level four of the lockdown. These Covid-19 denialists asked the court to strike down as unconstitutional the declaration of a national state of disaster and all the regulations under it.  They claimed that the government’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic was a “gross overreaction”.

 

Davis obliged them and declared most of the lockdown regulations to be invalid and unconstitutional but did so without considering the admissibility of the applicants allegations or their evidential weight. That is right –legal rules of evidence and procedure do not matter to ideologue judges because they first arrive at a predetermined outcome and then invoke their own hairy-brained philosophy to justify the result. In short, Davis ordered that “the regulations promulgated by the minister of cooperative governance and traditional affairs … are declared unconstitutional and invalid”.  He suspended his order for 14 days to allow Cooperative Governance Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma time to “review, amend and republish” some of the regulations. At the centre of his judgment was that each and every regulation under the Disaster Management Act had to be both rational in law and justifiable under the Constitution.  According to Davis, key evidence in the form of an affidavit from the co-operative governance and traditional affairs director-general on behalf of the minister did not show that Dlamini-Zuma had considered each of the regulations individually in terms of their constitutionality. He derisively and dismissively concluded: “The director-general’s affidavit contains mere platitudes in a generalised fashion in this regard, but nothing of substance.” He assumed the role of a super-legislator and asserted: “The clear inference I drew from the evidence is that once the minister had declared a national state of disaster … little or, in fact, no regard was given to the extent of the impact of individual regulations on the constitutional rights of people.”

 

In his myopic view, the government had to look at “every instance” where rights were being encroached on and inquire whether the encroachment was justifiable.  It mattered not that the Covid-19 pandemic was an emergency where government did not have the luxury of conducting meticulous scientific studies in individual cases and tailoring the regulations to suit those particular circumstances.  Davis ruled. “Without conducting such an inquiry, the enforcement of such means, even in a bona fide attempt to attain a legitimate end, would be arbitrary and unlawful.” For Davis, it was irrational that a hairdresser, willing to comply with preventative measures, had to “watch her children go hungry while witnessing minicab taxis pass with passengers in closer proximity to each other than they would have been in her salon”.  Davis continued: “To put it bluntly, it can hardly be argued that it is rational to allow scores of people to run on the promenade, but were one to [set] foot on the beach, it will lead to rampant infection.”  

 

The matter came on appeal before the Supreme Court of Appeal and is reported as Minister  of Cooperative  Governance  and  Traditional  Affairs v  De Beer and Another(Case no 538/2020) [2021] ZASCA 95(1 July2021).  The SCA judgment started of by a cautionary note:  “This case,  as we will show, is an object  lesson as  to  how  a  constitutional challenge to promulgated regulations should not be brought. It also serves to demonstrate that there should be a disciplined and cautious  curial  response,  lest diffuse,  rhetoric-laden, emotive and jurisprudentially unfocused litigation is encouraged. All the more so in this case, as it raises issues of national and international importance.” This was a polite way of saying Davis was bamboozeled by applicants’ rhetoric and could not distinguish chaff “rhetoric-laden, emotive and jurisprudentially unfocused” litigation from the real substance and facts supported by admissible evidence. 

 

The SCA dealt with the side issue of the Respondents’ conduct as they had adopted an uncompromising position. They made what can only  be described as a “scandalous accusation: that in the event that the Court proceeds with a virtual hearing, this Court will have become a mere ‘extension of the Appellant’s argument and that consequently the SCA is no longer independent’.” Para.50.  The SCA also noted a bizarre and insulting communication from De Beer and his crew as follows:

           

[117] As indicated earlier, it is now necessary to deal with the response by Mr de Beer and the LFN to the apology tendered by the Registrar to Mr de Beer and the LFN. On 18 June 2021, Mr de Beer wrote to the President of this Court. Once again, it is necessary to reproduce the written response in its entirety. It reads as follows:

‘1. The email dated 17th instant received from the Chief Registrar, Ms. Van der Merwe, which carried your answer to our letter dated 10th instant, refers.

2. After careful consideration of your official response, writer has decided to herewith inform you that the entire Supreme Court of Appeal may stick its fictitious “apology” to us in its arse.

3. As the leader of the institution, you have allowed the COVID-19 flimflam to take over the Court’s judicial functionality and for it to desecrate the institution to the point of pure codswallop which it is today – nothing but a mere extension of Government’s narrative; a Court which has lost its independence and which has become incapable of protecting the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and of protecting the very rights which Constitution and Bill of Rights afford the people.

4. Let writer remind you, Madam President of the Court, that neither you nor anyone of your judicial colleagues are divine and that the Court still belongs to the people of South Africa, and not the Government, which acts merely as their steward.

5. Even if the judgment in our very matter should be in our favour, LFN and writer shall appeal it as, either way, it will have come about by improper means and your bench will have made a charade of what was supposed to be a proper adjudication. Neither LFN nor writer are able to respect a judgment not rooted in true justice, as would normally have been delivered by the Appellate Division, something which the SCA used to be not too long ago.

 

The SCA referred to the “stick …in its arse” comment as “crude, gratuitously insulting, clearly contemptuous and intended to denigrate this court.”

 

On the merits the SCA slammed Davis for a number of reasons which revealed his incompetence. First, the judge set aside the regulations under both level four and level three. Yet the level three regulations were not before him: when the application was made and answered, the level three regulations had not been promulgated. The SCA stated: “Accordingly, it was impermissible for the high court to have considered and made a determination in respect of the Level 3 regulations, which were not properly before the high court. What is more, it arrived at its conclusion without affording the Minister an opportunity to be heard. The breach by the high court of something so fundamental as the right to be heard taints the high court’s judgment.” Id. at para. 82.   Further, the SCA continued: “Nor was it permissible for the high court to strike down regulations which it had not examined for want of legality. Extrapolation may take place in drawing factual conclusions on the basis of inference. The legal invalidity of a body of regulations cannot be determined on the basis that since certain specific regulations are found wanting, all such regulations stand condemned.” In short, Davis’ damnable approach was akin to determining legal cases by flipping a coin- he pronounced on regulations which were not properly before him and which he had not seen. The SCA summed up Davis inept approach as follows:

[84] At the hearing of the matter, neither the high court nor the parties had even so much as seen the Level 3 regulations. Indeed, the high court had observed that the Level 3 regulations ‘have neither been placed before me nor have the parties addressed me on them’. That notwithstanding, the high court appropriated to itself the right to consider and make a determination on the six Level 3 provisions. The judgment thus went beyond the respondent’s pleaded case. It goes without saying that any judgment should be the product of thorough consideration of, inter alia, forensically tested argument from both sides on issues that are necessary for the decision of the case.17 It ought to follow that on the strength of this fundamental error alone, the high court’s orders fall to be set aside.

 

The SCA was unsparing in its crticism of Davis’ elementary school-boy errors. It remarked that “even a superficial comparison reveals that the order which ultimately issued differed markedly from the compendious relief sought… The high court ranged beyond what had been sought by the respondents. Thus, not only was the Minister denied a proper hearing, but the respondents were granted relief that had never been sought. In that sense, not only did the judgment suffer a failure of proper judicial reasoning, but it also failed to recognise and respect – as it was constitutionally obliged to do – the limits of the judicial function, and hence the separation of powers.  The SCA cited the National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma [2009] ZASCA 1; 2009 (2) SA 277; 2009 (1) SACR 361 as follows:

 

‘It is crucial to provide an exposition of the functions of a judicial officer because, for reasons that are impossible to fathom, the court below failed to adhere to some basic tenets, in particular that in exercising the judicial function judges are themselves constrained by the law. The underlying theme of the court’s judgment was that the judiciary is independent; that judges are no respecters of persons; and that they stand between the subject and any attempted encroachments on liberties by the executive (para 161-162). This commendable approach was unfortunately subverted by a failure to confine the judgment to the issues before the court; by deciding matters that were not germane or relevant; by creating new factual issues; by making gratuitous findings against persons who were not called upon to defend themselves; by failing to distinguish between allegation, fact and suspicion; and by transgressing the proper boundaries between judicial, executive and legislative functions.

Judges as members of civil society are entitled to hold views about issues of the day and they may express their views provided they do not compromise their judicial office. . ..’

 

The Court recognized Davis’ failure to exercise judicial restraint and his astounding lack of familiarity with basic rules of evidence as follows:

 

[88] The foundation of the respondents’ case was based upon sweeping generalisations and broad conclusions. In the first place, the respondents did not file any confirmatory affidavits from those persons who had allegedly complained to Mr de Beer about the hardships that they were experiencing. In the second place, Mr de Beer simply annexed various reports to his affidavit (the provenance of which was not always clear), in support of what may somewhat loosely be described as COVID-19 denialism. As no affidavits accompanied these annexures, and Mr de Beer lacked the necessary expertise to testify to the truth of their content, the foundational hypothesis sought to be advanced by the respondents was unsupported. Regrettably, the high court simply failed to consider either the admissibility of the allegations advanced by Mr de Beer or their evidential weight, if any. Had it done so it would have arrived at the conclusion that, even on their own version, no cognisable case had been made out by the respondents.

[89] In the circumstances set out above, no answer, in truth, was called for by the Minister. That ought at the outset to have been appreciated by the high court. It found for the respondents on a case not made out in the founding affidavit and based largely on dispersed and inadmissible assertions and its own speculation as to how the regulations ought to have been framed.

 

As demonstrated clearly below, Davis did not heed the admonition of the SCA as he repeated the same judicial error in the Zuma tax matter where his determination of “public interest” was based on inadmissible hearsay evidence, a violation of the Plascon -Evans rule and blatant disregard of the doctrine of stare decisis.

 

The SCA further exposed Davis’ over-eagerness and proclivity to adjudicate cases and grant judgments on legal theories emanating from his own head but never pleaded by the parties.  The SCA stated:

[95] The respondents did not plead, or in any event properly plead, the constitutional attack that was upheld by the high court. Constitutional questions ought to be approached by litigants and courts alike with the appropriate degree of care. The Constitutional Court has repeatedly warned that constitutional attacks on the validity of legislation must be pleaded explicitly and with specificity to enable the State to know what case it has to meet and to adduce the evidence necessary to do so…

 

[100] This was not merely a matter of form or ‘elegance’ as the high court suggested. The high court was willing to see a case where there was none and unjustifiably excused the manner in which it was framed. To sum up on this aspect of the case: The case put forward by the respondents was wholly inadequate. There was no cognisable case to answer.

 

The SCA remarked that “a rationality attack also needs to be properly pleaded so that the functionary knows what he or she is being called upon to explain. Despite the fact that no such attack was pleaded, supposed irrationality was at the heart of the high court’s condemnation of those particular regulations which it specifically considered.” Id. at para.102. It also faulted Davis’ approach in the following terms:

First, in each case the high court deduced irrationality from the fact that some other conduct, thought by the court to be equally or more worthy of restriction, had not been restricted. Second, instead of limiting itself to an enquiry into the presence or absence of a rational connection between the measure and its purpose, the court strayed into considerations as to whether other (and in the court’s opinion, evidently better) means might have been adopted.

 

The conclusion is unmistakable that Davis gives vent to his own personal opinions and preferences, usurps policy-making function of the executive and does not respect proper separation of powers.  This is clear from the following observation by the SCA:

[106] These legal errors permeated the high court’s findings in respect of the validity of the regulations. In that, the approach was also fatally flawed. The high court did not properly apply the rationality test to each of the impugned regulations. Instead, it embarked upon a comparative exercise and for the rest, it relied upon conjecture and speculation. It lost from sight that the question is not whether some other measure might better achieve the purpose or might be more appropriate, only whether the measure actually employed is rationally related to the purpose.

 

The SCA gave short-shrift treatment to Davis’ judgment and summed up his litany of errors as follows: “The high court struck down regulations that had not been challenged, on a case not properly pleaded, and on the basis of reasoning that the invalidity of certain regulations must contaminate all the regulations. In sum, neither the challenge brought, nor the high court’s reasons for sustaining that challenge can be allowed to stand.”  Sadly, Davis rendered an even worse judgment in the Zuma tax disclosure case.

 

Judge Davis’ Continued Incompetence and Gross Errors in the Zuma Tax Case

 

The total sum of Judge Davis’ judgment revolves around the following totally unsubstantiated findings of facts:

Para. 5.1 The applicants relied on the averments extracted from a book published in October 2017, titled The President's keepers. by Taleberg publishers. The author is an investigative journalist, Jacques Pauw. the averments relied on by thc applicants in their papers regarding Mr Zuma's tax affairs during his presidency are the following:

·      that Mr Zuma did not submit tax returns at all for the first seven years of his presidency;

·      that he owed millions of  rand in tax for the fringe benefits he received because of the so-called security upgrades to his Nkandla residence;

·      that he received various donations from illicit sources — alleged to be tobacco smugglers, Russian oligarchs and the Gupta family;

·      that he had drawn a six-figure 'salary' as an 'employee' of a Durban security company for the first few months of his Presidency (it appears that he had subsequently paid the money back in response to queries);

·      that Mr Zuma had appointed Mr Tom Moyane as the Commissioner ol SARS to undermine the institution's enforcement capability and to prevent it from prosecuting Mr Zuma for non-payment of taxes and other financial malfeasance, and from investigating people linked to him; and

·      that it was not clear whether Mr Zuma was tax-compliant at the time of publication and that it was probable that SARS was not taking steps to extract the tax he owed.

 

To put it bluntly, the applicants approached the Court with completely hearsay accusations and reports woven entirely from untested hearsay, the gossamer strands of speculation and surmise emanating from a published book which is not admissible evidence.  True to Davis’ incompetence observed by the SCA, he failed to display the requisite “disciplined and cautious  curial  response, and instead allowed “diffuse,  rhetoric-laden, emotive and jurisprudentially unfocused litigation” to unfold under his watch.  A second year law student would intuitively recognize that the allegations in Pauw’s book are rank hearsay and are not admissible simply because a litigant parrots the same gossip story in an affidavit placed before the Court.  Just like in the Covid-19 judgment, Davis was prepared to engage in a breach of something so fundamental as the admission of inadmissible hearsay evidence in motion proceedings. Just like in the Covid-19 case where Davis was prepared  to strike down regulations which it had not examined for want of legality” Davis relied on untested hearsay contained in a book he probably never read. 

 

Most fundamental, Davis’ incompetently ignored the basic “Plascon Evans” rule applicable in motion proceedings. Where the applicants seek final relief on motion, “bona fide factual disputes must thus be determined on the respondents’ version. A purported factual dispute will lack bona fides only if the respondent’s version is a bald or uncreditworthy denial or is palpably implausible, far-fetched or so clearly untenable that the court is justified in rejecting it on the papers. See, Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd [2006] ZASCA 52; 2006 (4) SA 326 (SCA) para 55; National Director Of Public Prosecutions v Zuma [2009] ZASCA 1; 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA) para 26.”  Even worse, Davis not only admitted and relied on inadmissible hearsay but went on to resolve bona fide factual disputes in favour of the applicants and contrary to the evidence on the record.  The sincerity of the applicants’ belief in the veracity of Pauw’s allegations cannot serve as substitute for cogent admissible evidence that must be a basis for a court judgment. 

 

Davis failed to comprehend the general rule that where, in proceedings on notice of motion, disputes of facts have arisen on the affidavits, a final order, whether it be an interdict or some other form of relief, may be granted if those facts averred in the applicant's affidavits which have been admitted by the respondent or not placed in dispute, together with the facts alleged by the respondent, justify such an order.  But here the respondent SARS denied the averments but Davis simply disagreed with the SARS’ denial.  That is a basic error.

 

If the Court is satisfied as to the inherent credibility of the applicant's factual averment, it may then proceed on the basis of the correctness thereof, and include this fact among those upon which it determines whether the applicant is entitled to the final relief which he seeks. But here there was both a denial by SARS and lack of admissible evidence from the applicants. Inadmissible evidence does not become admissible simply because an applicant has relied on it in a sworn affidavit placed before the Court.  Davis compounded the problem by not only taking allegations in a book as gospel truth but by proceeding to make findings that those allegations sufficiently undergird a “public interest” justification for making confidential taxpayer information available to any busy-body journalist.

 

Another instance of judicial ill-discipline is manifested in Davis’ treatment of the allegations that Zuma “owed millions of rand in tax for the fringe benefits he received because of the so-called security upgrades to his Nkandla residence.” The Concourt resolved exactly that issue in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [2016] ZACC 11 through the following order that:

5. The National Treasury must determine the reasonable costs of those measures implemented by the Department of Public Works at the President’s Nkandla homestead that do not relate to security, namely the visitors’ centre, the amphitheatre, the cattle kraal, the chicken run and the swimming pool only.

 

6. The National Treasury must determine a reasonable percentage of the costs of those measures which ought to be paid personally by the President.

 

7. The National Treasury must report back to this Court on the outcome of its determination within 60 days of the date of this order.

 

8. The President must personally pay the amount determined by the National Treasury in terms of paragraphs 5 and 6 above within 45 days of this Court’s signification of its approval of the report.

 

Judge Davis committed a fundamental error on this score. Unquestionably, decisions of the Constitutional Court are binding on all lesser courts based on the principle of stare decisis, which is a juridical command to the courts to respect decision already made in a given area of the law. This means that the High Court must follow the decisions of the courts superior to it even if such decisions are clearly wrong. The statement of principle by Didcott J in Credex Finance (Pty) Ltd v Kuhn 1977 (3) SA 482 (N) that is thus concisely summarised in the headnote to that judgment is in point:

"The doctrine of judicial precedent would be subverted if judicial officers, of their own accord or at the instance of litigants, were to refuse to follow decisions binding on them in the hope that appellate tribunals with the power to do so might be persuaded to reverse the decisions and thus to vindicate them ex post facto. Such a course cannot be tolerated."

 

In practical terms this means that once the Constitutional Court ruled that Zuma was obligated to pay “the reasonable costs of those measures implemented by the Department of Public Works at the President’s Nkandla homestead that do not relate to security as determined by National Treasury, it was no longer permissible for a litigant in a lower court to argue that Zuma had a duty to pay “millions of rand in tax for the fringe benefits he received because of the so-called security upgrades to his Nkandla residence.”  Because the Concourt was clear that only costs that “do not relate to security” were payable, it was no longer open for the High Court to rule that Zuma  was liable in tax for the fringe benefits he received because of the so-called security upgrades to his Nkandla residence.  Davis incompetently did so and this resulted in a High Court judgment which contradicted and undermined a judgment of the apex court on exactly the same issue.

 

The Concourt was unambiguous and clear that the National Treasury first had to determine “a reasonable percentage of the costs of those measures which ought to be paid personally by the President”, that the National Treasury “must report back to this Court on the outcome of its determination” within a specified period and that the “President must personally pay the amount determined by the National Treasury” in terms of the Concourt order.  The entire universe of what costs and related taxes Zuma owed on the Nkandla non-security upgrades was dictated by the Concourt’s order and not what some journalist believes should be the payable tax. Faced with an explicit  Concourt judgment that specifically said Zuma was liable for costs not related to security on the one hand and the argument of the applicants journalists that Zuma was liable in tax “for the fringe benefits he received because of the so-called security upgrades to his Nkandla residence” on the other, Judge Davis preferred and endorse the opinions of the journalists. So much for judicial independence and impartiality! The entire premise of Davis’ ruling on the Nkandla tax issue was grossly erroneous and insufficient to sustain a judgment invoking the so-called “public interest” exception.  But it gets worse.

 

Judge Davis opined that “Mr Zuma has not opposed the application, neither in general nor in respect of the relief aimed at disclosure of his personal tax affairs and has not delivered any affidavit addressing the aforesaid allegations made regarding himself and his tax compliance.” But that was all a pretext to justify an unsustainable judgment. Davis was fully conversant with the Concourt ruling in Nkandla and could have easily taken judicial notice thereof and informed the applicants that their case trenched on a ruling of the apex court on exactly the same issues and that he was bound by stare decisis to follow the Concourt ruling.  That he failed to do so speaks to his ill-discipline and incompetence – it has nothing to do with whether Zuma filed any affidavit in opposition.  Davis was willing to take judicial notice of the Zondo Commission proceedings and hearsay testimony before it but he could not take judicial notice of a binding ruling by the highest court in the land.

 

Davis stumbles on another minefield as evidenced by paragraph 5.2 of his judgment. He states: Some of the allegations are confirmed or corroborated by public documents, such as the findings of personal benefit derived from the upgrades to the Nkandla residence contained in the then Public Protector's report entitled “Secure in Comfort”, evidence led at the Nugent commission and the findings made regarding the undermining of SARS by a previous commissioner, Mr Moyane and the evidence led at commission of enquiry into 'State Capture' chaired by DCJ Zondo.”  Further, Davis boldly asserts in paragraph 5.3 that based on these allegations, “the applicants aver that "credible evidence" exists that Mr Zuma was not tax-compliant while he was president.”  Again there is a huge jurisprudential problem that collapses the entire judgment and renders it not worth the paper it is written on.

 

For starters, as shown above, Davis misrepresents the content of the Public Protector report as clarified and enforced by the Concourt’s very explicit order. What he claims is “confirmed” is purely a figment of his judicial imagination.  The applicants’ allegations actually contradicted both the Public Protector’s findings and the subsequent Concourt judgment.  Not that Davis cares about such flagrant inconsistencies. 

 

Judge Davis has a long documented history of struggle with the law of evidence. The wheels come completely off the wagon when Davis discusses the so-called evidence led at the “Nugent Commission and the findings made regarding the undermining of SARS by a previous commissioner, Mr Moyane.”  I am horrified that the judge is ignorant of the fact that the findings of the Nugent Commission of Enquiry are not automatically admissible in court proceedings.

 

It is accepted almost universally that that Commissions of Enquiry are not courts of law and evidence adduced during a commission’s inquiry is not automatically admissible in civil or criminal proceedings. In New Zealand the judiciary has long made it pellucid that commissions of inquiries are not courts of law, nor administrative tribunals. See, for example, Peters v Davison [1999] 2 NZLR 164, 181 (CA). Such Commissions do not have the power of determination, and their recommendations and findings bind no one.  They can even be ignored or rejected by the executive willy-nilly.

 

The Davison Court cited In Re the Royal Commission to Inquire into and Report upon State Services in New Zealand [1962] NZLR 96 at p 109 where North J said:

 

''A Commission of Inquiry is certainly not a Court of law. . . . Nor is a Commission of Inquiry to be likened to an administrative tribunal entrusted with the duty of deciding questions between parties. There is nothing approaching a lis , a Commission has no general power of adjudication, it determines nobody's rights, its report is binding on no one.''

 

The Davison court also made the following observation:

“In opposition are basic characteristics of a commission of inquiry. Its report is merely an expression of its opinion. A commission of inquiry is not to be likened to a Court of law nor to an administrative tribunal entrusted with the duty of deciding questions between parties; there is nothing approaching a lis and the commission has no general power of adjudication (North J in Re the Royal Commission to Inquire into and Report upon State Services in New Zealand at p 109). It follows that the reports of commissions of inquiry have no immediate legal effect. Because the reports of commissions of inquiry are, in the end, only expressions of opinion, "[i]n themselves they do not alter the legal rights of the persons to whom they refer"

 

 

The Court, in another New Zealand case, Re Erebus Royal Commission (No 2) [1981] 1 NZLR 618, made important observations as follows:

''This is not an appeal. Parties to hearings by Commissions of Inquiry have no rights of appeal against the reports. The reason is partly that the reports are, in a sense, inevitably inconclusive. Findings made by Commissioners are in the end only expressions of opinion. They would not even be admissible in evidence in legal proceedings as to the cause of a disaster. In themselves they do not alter the legal rights of the persons to whom they refer. Nevertheless they may greatly influence public and Government opinion and have a devastating effect on personal reputations; and in our judgment these are the major reasons why in appropriate proceedings the Courts must be ready if necessary, in relation to Commissions of Inquiry just as to other public bodies and officials, to ensure that they keep within the limits of their lawful powers and comply with any applicable rules of natural justice.''[1]

 

Canadian courts have also accepted the well-established principle that a Commission of Inquiry may not draw conclusions, or make recommendations regarding the civil or criminal responsibility of any person or organization. They are generally prohibited from making any findings of criminal or civil responsibility, and no such finding may be inferred from any of a Commissioner’s remarks. Such a prohibition is necessary because a commission may admit evidence not given under oath, and the ordinary rules of evidence which provide protection against such matters as hearsay do not apply to public inquiries.   Justice Cory of the  Canadian Supreme Court  in Canada (Attorney General) v. Canada (Commission of lnquiry on the Blood System) (1997), 151 D.L.R. (4th) 1, said the following about the history, nature and role of inquiry commissions in that country:

 

29         Commissions of inquiry have a long history in Canada, and have become a significant and useful part of our tradition. They have frequently played a key role in the investigation of tragedies and made a great many helpful recommendations aimed at rectifying dangerous situations.

...

34         A commission of inquiry is neither a criminal trial nor a civil action for the determination of liability. It cannot establish either criminal culpability or civil responsibility for damages. Rather, an inquiry is an investigation into an issue, event or series of events. The findings of a commissioner relating to that investigation are simply findings of fact and statements of opinion reached by the commissioner at the end of the inquiry. They are unconnected to normal legal criteria. They are based upon and flow from a procedure which is not bound by the evidentiary or procedural rules of a courtroom. There are no legal consequences attached to the determinations of a commissioner. They are not enforceable and do not bind courts considering the same subject matter. ... Thus, although the findings of a commissioner may affect public opinion, they cannot have either penal or civil consequences. To put it another way, even if a commissioner’s findings could possibly be seen as determinations of responsibility by members of the public, they are not and cannot be findings of civil or criminal responsibility.

 

 

Very interesting insights are contained in the judgments in the High Court and in the Supreme Court of Ireland  in the leading case of Goodman International and Lawrence Goodman v. The Honourable Mr. Justice Liam Hamilton, Ireland and the Attorney General [1992] 2 IR 542.  This decision is now the foundation, in Irish law, of the constitutionality of the Tribunal of Inquiry, as known in Irish law.   In Goodman, the former Chief Justice said at p.590:

 

“With regard to the suggestion that the findings of the Tribunal if not an impermissible administration of justice by a body other than a court, is a usurpation of the activities of courts in cases where either civil cases are pending or may be instituted, it seems to me that again this submission arises from a total misunderstanding of the function of the Tribunal. A finding by this Tribunal, either of the truth or of the falsity of any particular allegation which may be the subject matter of existing or potential litigation, forms no part of the material which a court which has to decide that litigation could rely upon. It cannot either be used as a weapon of attack or defence by a litigant who in relation to the same matter is disputing with another party rights arising from some allegation of breach of contract or illegal conduct or malpractice. I am, therefore, satisfied that the submission under Article 34 must fail”. (Emphasis added)

 

 Commissions of inquiry all seem to have several things in common - such tribunals operate “in vacuo” and are of “sterile of legal effect” in that their reports are simply opinions and “devoid of legal consequences”.  Davis who has struggled with basic rules of evidence throughout his judicial career erred in using the Nugent report as a weapon or a shield in the hands of the applicants and in finding that the applicants’ allegations were credible because they parroted the findings of Nugent.  Davis  did not regard the Nugent report as “devoid of legal consequences” or “sterile of legal effect”.  Instead it elevated it improperly to assume the status of a court judgment. That was purely wrong.  A matter of fact requiring to be established before a court must be established by admissible evidence which is open to cross-examination and contradiction, and is given publicly before the Court. It is not normally an admissible form of proof to produce a statement by a third party whether a policeman, a government minister or a Commission of Inquiry and to claim that that has evidential effect, prima facie or otherwise. An exception to this arises, of course, where there is an issue which, by virtue of a decision of a court of competent jurisdiction, is res judicata between the parties; but such a decision of a court will itself have been reached on admissible evidence duly adduced in a hearing which observes all the parties’ procedural rights.  The decision of the Judge Davis would be reversed on appeal only if the judiciary did not harbour such inveterate hatred of President Zuma.

 

Even assuming Davis’ reliance on the “findings” of the Nugent Commission could somehow be explained or justified, the judge’s reliance on the “evidence led at commission of enquiry into 'State Capture' chaired by DCJ Zondo” is grossly incompetent.  DCJ Zondo is still writing a report in which he will deal with all evidentiary issues including the credibility of witnesses, the admissibility of evidentiary material, cogency of the evidence and what weight to accord to said evidence. But Davis has already jumped the gun to rule that any evidence led before Zondo is admissible to shore up the applicants’ case.  What if Zondo rejects the same evidence in his final report?   Judge Davis simply cannot handle complex matters but he is white and therefore immune from criticism. He has been spared the venomous, racist and vicious attacks directed at the Public Protector Advocate Mkhwbane who is a black woman. 

 

One final point in regard to the merits - the horrid judgment is not worth a longiloquent dissertation as it is devoid of any cogent constitutional merits. The unsound judgment does incalculable damage to our jurisprudence and solidifies in the minds of some of our citizens that the judiciary has become partisan in the factional political battles of parties and that court judgments are tailored to target certain disfavored persons such as President Zuma.  Without question, the applicants weaved an entirely false narrative against Zuma and argued on the grounds of public interest, that this overrides Zuma’s right to tax secrecy, because of the particular circumstances of this case.  Judge Davis was overly eager to indulge the applicants and lend a helping hand – he threw overboard all legal rules of civil procedure and evidence and bent over backward to accommodate them.  As shown here, he went so far as to ignore Constitutional Court’s findings or rulings on the very same issue being litigated. He went further and sought to legislate from the bench and declared legislation passed by Parliament as unconstitutional.  The judge invoked his own junk science and rejected SARS’s articulated rationale that lifting the confidentiality of taxpayer information would weaken tax compliance.  Just like in the Covid-19 case Davis refashioned the law to suit his own philosophy and political predilections.  

 

 

What is to Be Done Now and Where To?

 

SARS has been weaponized as an anti-Zuma tool by the Ramaphosa faction of the ANC and I do not expect anything that makes legal sense to come from SARS. Even if it appeals, its appeal would be nothing more than a charade with no serious legal arguments raised.

 

I must unapologetically state that SARS has gone through the motions and put up a phony legal fight in the Zuma tax release matter. For public propaganda purposes SARS has claimed that it battled to keep Zuma's tax records under wraps. Not, it says, because of who he is - but because of the far-reaching implications the disclosure of taxpayer information could have on its ability to collect revenue. But there is a coda –SARS was represented by Advocate Wim Trengove SC in the matter. Yes the same Trengove who is appointed by the NPA, without any compliance with procurement processes, to prosecute Zuma for alleged corruption related to the arms deal case and tax evasion. On the one hand he is supposed to prosecute Zuma for alleged corruption and tax evasion while on the other hand he is supposed to protect Zuma and keep his tax records confidential! Sadly, that is how the jurisprudence of this country has been destroyed with judges like Davis sheepishly going along.

 

Trengove’s startling and revealing attitude is summed up in paragraph 5.5 of Judge Davis judgment as follows: “In SARS’ opposing affidavits and in arguments presented on its behalf by Adv Trengove SC, it pleaded "agnostic" to the tax affairs of former president Zuma. This must not be construed as either an admission or denial of the allegations, but merely an extension of its obligations not to disclose the tax affairs of any taxpayer in terms of section 69 of TAA and in circumstances as the present.”

 

 Trengove is an experienced advocate but one is left with lingering doubts about whether he did not knowingly throw away the case because it touched on aspects relating to Jacob Zuma’s tax and other matters for which he is currently prosecuting Zuma.  Strategically, allowing the release of Zuma’s tax information to journalists may benefit the NPA in several ways - it continues the vilification campaign against Zuma started by the NPA from the very inception of the arms deal corruption case; it increases the public condemnation of Zuma and subjects him to torture in the court of public opinion and it gives the NPA cover as it has already released confidential information about Zuma to specific journalists like Sam Sole who was an applicant in the very same tax case.

 

In the recent application to remove Bill Downer from the Zuma prosecution, President Zuma’s argued that Downer groomed journalists such as Sam Sole who he unleashed to write adverse articles against Zuma. Prosecutorial independence demands that no organ of state and no member or employee of an organ of state nor any other person shall improperly interfere with, hinder or obstruct the prosecuting authority or any member thereof in the exercise, carrying out or performance of its, his or her powers, duties and functions. When viewed in this context, the Davis judgment is simply another stratagem used to legitimize the disclosure and leaking of information about Zuma that has been going on for over twenty years. As demonstrated conclusively here, Judge Norman Davis clutched at straws to legitimize a far more sinister and wider agenda to unleash journalists against Zuma and to further the narrative that he is corrupt and has dodged taxes.

 

I conclude by reminding the reader that Trengove was counsel for one of the parties in the “Nkandla” judgment matter and was completely familiar with the Concourt ruling and order insofar as it related to the scope of Zuma’s obligations to pay a percentage of non-security costs.  It is anyone’s guess why Trengove advised SARS to adopt a supine “agnostic” strategy instead of pointing out how the pseudo-journalists were distorting facts to the detriment of the court and the public.  Steve Biko was right – Black Man You are on Your Own!

 

I am tempted to write more about the credibility of the main investigative journalist Pauw whose tales were the foundation of  Davis’ judgment.  For disclosure, four ago I exposed Pauw’s shady character as a dishonest racist. See, Journalist's anti-Zuma frame determines the outcome of the case he purports to state against the NPA; Paul Ngobeni ...https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/the-sunday-independent/20171203/281779924451568   Just this year around February, Pauw was caught in a bizarre twisted case of lies, drunkeness and apparent sexual immorality that eventually led to his axing by the Daily Maverick.  See, https://www.702.co.za/articles/409020/pauw-didn-t-just-do-damage-his-credibility-but-he-damaged-daily-maverick-s

 

I hope President Zuma has a good laugh at Pauw’s expense! In February, after midday on Saturday, Pauw arrived at a Waterfroont Cape Town restaurant with a young female companion (most likely a hired call girl). “Pauw described her to one source as a journalism student writing a piece on his work, and to Daily Maverick as an aspiring Angolan writer asking for help on a book project. .. His descriptions of his companion are obviously inconsistent and appear to change every time he tells the story. Regardless, for the following six hours, they consumed what can only be described as a staggering amount of alcohol — one draught of beer, three bottles of sauvignon blanc, two gin and tonics, and 20 shots of tequila…” See, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-02-19-jacques-pauw-affair-the-story-the-facts-the-fallout-and-the-future/   The story continued: “Shortly before 6.30pm, Pauw was seen in CCTV footage without his companion. He counted out six or seven bills, and attempted to pay the R1,630 cheque with a combo of cash and bank card. The card was declined, and the waiter returned it. In his original column, Pauw claimed that he left his keys and cellphone with the woman at the table and went to draw money from an ATM, using this as “proof” that he would never have considered absconding. This account is untrue. Instead, the footage now depicts his female companion returning to the table. She apparently urged the waiter to try the card again. Sitting, she gesticulated at Pauw, who appeared passive and unresponsive. She stood up, took the cash off the table and pocketed it. This would appear to explain the missing R1,000 Pauw accused the police of stealing from him. (To be clear: we do not know why she took the cash.) The woman is also believed to have taken his keys and cellphone, which Pauw now confirms, and he told us that he picked it up from her in Cape Town when he got out of jail. Id.  Pauw even attempted to flee the restaurant without paying his bill.

 

After all his disgraceful conduct, Pauw had the nerve to publish a false cover-up article in which he accused the police of unlawfully arresting him and subjecting him to all kinds of indignities.  When that lie was exposed Pauw later wrote: “I am privileged and have a public persona …which others do not have. They are vulnerable and have little recourse.” He then quoted constitutional law professor Pierre de Vos: “The richer and the whiter you are, the less likely that you will be wrongfully arrested.”  Id. He could have added that judges like Davis would swallow hook line and sinker anything uttered by a white racist, drunkard, immoral conman and a liar so long as it is contained in a book and it is about Jacob Zuma!



[1] In Erebus (No 2) at p 653, Cooke, Richardson and Somers JJ.

Tuesday, September 7, 2021

President Zuma's Medical Parole – A Cruel Reminder of Ramaphosas’s Constitutional Failure

 

                     By: Paul M. Ngobeni

Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin said: "It is impossible to predict the time and progress of revolution. It is governed by its own more or less mysterious laws." There is no doubt that this statement rings true today in no less a place than South Africa and, more particularly, under the failed leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa and the African National Congress. Barely three years ago, it was unthinkable that ANC workers and their families would be forced into starvation and go for months without their salaries being paid by the billionaire-led ANC; that their former president Jacob Zuma would be the first political prisoner sentenced and incarcerated by the apex court without the benefit of a trial in violation of our constitution and international law; that the fumbling leadership of the ANC would fail to register candidates in some wards in at least 36 municipalities and to submit all its proportional representation lists and that the ANC president would be reduced to applauding a parole board’s decision to release former President Zuma on parole.  The same hypocritial President abysmally failed to exercise his constitutional powers to grant Zuma a full and unconditional pardon. Ramaphosa’s weak leadership was not only exposed by the speed and intensity with which mass protests occurred in the aftermath of Zuma’s incarceration but he was left incoherent and caught in the paralysis of analysis – he could not articulate whether the country experienced an :insurrection” or a “attempted insurrection” and whether these mass protests were a direct outcome of pent-up frustrations over the government’s inability to effect meaningful changes in the lives of our citizens.

 

As a preliminary matter I need to address the hullabaloo about the decision to release former President Zuma on parole. With the exception of the sober voice of UDM’s Bantu Holomisa, the white-controlled opposition parties have been unanimous in their condemnation of the parole decision with some describing it as “disgusting, and a mockery of South African law” and claiming that it's a case of history repeating itself, with Zuma joining his former financial advisor, Shabir Shaik on medical parole.  Not to be outdone, the Uncle Tom party, the Congress of the People vehemently protested and called Zuma’s release “preferential treatment and abuse of power.” How many 80 year olds with serious health problems identical to Mr Zuma are incarcerated in our prisons?  But that is not a surprising posture by the self-hating blacks in that failed outfit called COPE.  The racist DA, which has always supported white murderers being freed on parole and has consorted with apartheid war criminals like De Klerk, says the move is nothing short of being entirely unlawful. It has gone a step further to lay the blame squarely on Arthur Fraser, who is now the Correctional Services Commissioner, and signed off on Zuma’s release. 

 

But the blame for the entire saga must be placed squarely at the feet of Justice Khampepe and the Constitutional Court.  The Court did the most unusual and constitutionally suspect thing - it convicted and sentenced Zuma to a prison term without any trial, without any opportunity for argument in mitigation of sentence and actually issued an order and deadlines for Zuma’s surrender to prison authorities.  Further it ordered the executive to take several steps to effect Zuma’s arrest and imprisonment if he did not surrender by the court-imposed deadlines.  Courts never issue such bizarre  orders after sentencing any prisoner to a determinate prison sentence.  Normally proper separation of powers principles are observed and respected.

 

The Court’s unusual orders specifically tailored for Zuma improperly usurped the ability of the executive to conduct its preliminary assessment of whether Zuma, in light of his age and health status should have been incarcerated in the first place.  Ordinarily, prison authorities must enjoy deference and untrammeled powers in the admission of prisoners and determination of whether some may not be suitable candidate for incarceration, taking into account their health status.  Imagine if President Zuma had succumbed to his illness and died in prison!

 

Courts have cautioned that the separation of powers considerations must find application in those scenarios where convicted persons ate sentenced. In S v Botha 2006(2) SACR 110 (SCA) the High Court convicted the appellant of murder and attempting to defeat the ends of justice, sentenced him to 18 years' imprisonment, and recommended that he should serve at least two-thirds of the sentence before being considered for parole. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal held, inter alia:

 

The function of a sentencing court is to determine the term of imprisonment that a person, who has been convicted of an offence, should serve. A court has no control over the minimum period of the sentence that ought to be served by such a person. A recommendation of the kind encountered here is an undesirable incursion into the domain of another arm of State, which is bound to cause tension between the Judiciary and the executive. Courts are not entitled to prescribe to the executive branch of government how long a convicted person should be detained, thereby usurping the function of the executive... Albeit just a recommendation, its persuasive force is not to be underestimated. It, no doubt, was intended to be acted upon. In making the recommendation which it did, the trial Court may have imposed, by a different route, a punishment which in truth and in fact was more severe than originally intended. Such a practice is not only undesirable but also unfair to both an accused person as well as the correctional services authorities. The Registrar has been instructed to forward a copy of this judgment to the Department of Correctional Services with a request that the remarks [above] be taken account of in relation to the present case. Id. paras 25 - 27.

 

The scuttlebutt lies spread about Fraser’s handling of the Zuma parole must be exposed and debunked outrightly. Under our laws, namely, the Correctional Services Act, the Department of Correctional Services has a wide discretion to grant parole on medical or humanitarian conditions. In March of 2012 the Act was amended to simultaneously broaden the circumstances under which medical parole can be granted and tighten up the process undertaken for it. The legislation prior to the 2012 amendment stipulated that the applicant must be in the final stages of their terminal illness. The new amendment, however, omits the terms “final stages” and it is in the regulations to the Act that the decision-makers are listing the illnesses and stages of illness which begin to define the degree of sickness an applicant must be in.  Medical professionals make the professional assessment and a judgment call after a thorough examination of an inmate’s health status.  As of 2012, a prisoner may be released on medical parole upon satisfying the following three strict conditions:

 

1. The offender is suffering from a terminal disease or condition or if such offender is rendered physically incapacitated as a result of injury, disease or illness so as to severely limit daily activity or inmate self-care;

             2. The risk of re-offending is low; and

 3. There are appropriate arrangements for the inmate’s supervision, care and treatment within the community to which the inmate is to be released.

 

Without doubt, President Zuma meets all of the above strict criteria. Furthermore, the regulations also say that the medical parole review board can take any other factor into consideration, provided that it is in line with Section 79 of the Correctional Services Act. This means that the board, to a large extent, is able to exercise their own discretion.  But the DA’s strategy of targeting and attacking Fraser as the sole actor and fall guy is reminiscent of the typical ANC “New Dawn” strategy that has been in vogue since Ramaphosa was elevated as ANC president.  Persons such as Jiba, Brian Molefe and many others have been vilified  and removed from positions simply because they were associated with former president Zuma.

 

The rigors of the penal system are thought to be mitigated to some degree by the discretion of those who enforce the law. See, e. g., Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. Am. Inst. Crim. L. & C. 3, 6 (1940-1941). The clemency or parole power is designed to serve the same function. Among its benign if too-often ignored objects, the clemency power can correct injustices that the ordinary criminal process seems unable or unwilling to consider. These mechanisms hold out the promise that mercy is not foreign to our system. The law must serve the cause of justice.  But a President who is controlled by or beholden to a super-rich racist Stellenbosch clique cannot exercise the constitutional clemency powers granted to him by the Constitution.  That is why the disgraceful ANC “lekgotla” was also reduced to applauding a decision of a parole board instead of asking their president to exercise his constitutional powers to grant Zuma full and unconditional pardon.

 

It takes no rocket science to understand that the Constitutional Court sentencing of Zuma was a gross violation of the basic sentencing principles of our laws. In S v Selebi (Judgment on sentence) (25/2009) [2010] ZAGPJHC 58 (3 August 2010) Joffe J stated the following:

 

1. The principles applicable in determining a fair, balanced and appropriate sentence have long been laid down. In S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A) at 540 G it was held that "What has to be considered is the triad consisting of the crime, the offender and the interests of society." In determining an appropriate sentence regard must be had inter alia to the main purposes of punishment. These purposes were described in R v Swanepoel 1945 AD 444 at 455 as deterrent, preventative, reformative and retributive, in S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) at 862 A-B reference was made to Gordon, Criminal Law of Scotland, (1967) at 50 where it was stated that "The retributive theory finds the justification for punishment in a past act, a wrong which requires punishment or expiation... The other theories, reformative, preventive and deterrent, all find their justification in the future, in the good that will be produced as a result of the punishment".

 

2. In S v Khumalo and Others [1984] ZASCA 30; 1984 (3) SA 327 AD at 330 E it was held, with reference to R v Swanepoel supra that deterrence has been described as the "essential", "all important", "paramount" and "universally admitted" object of punishment. The Appellate Division, as the Supreme Court of Appeal was then known, proceeded to state in the Khumalo judgment, that the other purposes of punishment are accessory to deterrence, in this regard reference was made to R v Karg 1961 (1) SA 231 at 236 A-B where it was held while the deterrent effect of punishment has remained as important as ever, the retributive effect, whilst by no means absent from the modern approach to sentencing, has tended to yield ground to aspects of prevention and correction…

 

4. When determining an appropriate sentence there is, as was pointed out in S v Rabie supra at 861 B, a duty on the presiding judicial officer to approach the determination with a mindset of mercy or compassion or plain humanity. This "has nothing in common with maudlin sympathy for the accused. While recognizing that fair punishment may sometimes have to be robust, mercy is a balanced and humane quality of thought which tempers one's approach when considering the basic factors of letting the punishment fit the criminal as well as the crime and being fair to society". This is certainly not a new concept. Voet, vol.1, 57 stated in a note (Gane's translation, vol. 2. 72) It is true, as Cicero says in his work on Duties , Bk. 1, Ch. 25, that anger should be especially kept down in punishing, because he who comes to punishment in wrath will never hold that middle course which lies between the too much and the too little. It is also true that it would be desirable that they who hold the office of Judges should be like the laws, which approach punishment not in a spirit of anger but in one of equity." As was stated in S v Rabie supra at 862 D, 'To sum up, with particular reference to the concept of mercy ~(i) It is a balanced and humane state of thought, (it) It tempers one's approach to the factors to be considered in arriving at an appropriate sentence. (Hi) It has nothing in common with maudlin sympathy for the accused, (iv) It recognizes that fair punishment may sometimes have to be robust, (v) It eschews insensitive censoriousness in sentencing a fellow mortal, and so avoids severity in anger, (vi) The measure of the scope of mercy depends upon the circumstances of each case". (emphasis in the original)

 

The emotion-laden pronouncement of Justice Khampepe about Zuma was a far cry from the above basic principles and totally out of kilter with our laws. South African jurisprudence accepts mero motu that once an offender has reached an  advanced age, it may be regarded as a mitigating factor in the sentencing  of  such an offender.  The Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Zinn (1969 2 SA 537 (A), set out tersely the three most important matters a court should take into consideration in imposing sentence. In this case the court had to weigh the accused's personal circumstances (and more particularly the fact that he was already relatively old and suffering ill-health) against the nature of the crime and the interests of society. The appellant's personal circumstances constitute mitigating circumstances, whereas the nature of the crime and the interests of society amount to aggravating circumstances.

 

It should be noted that the South African reported judgments seem to regard a person as elderly from about 58, although that would depend on the offender before the court, especially since old age is often accompanied by another mitigating factor, namely illness or ill health. It has been said that the rationale for the reduction in sentence is compassion. It “evokes a note of compassion in considering the bleak recompense of imprisonment in the afternoon of his years” (S v Heller supra 55C-D). The mitigation of a sentence for imprisonment especially is based on compassion coupled with the community expectation that old people would be treated with sympathy (S v Munyai supra 255h-i). The purpose of a sentence is not to destroy the offender completely (S v Zinn supra 541B-C) and the period of imprisonment would not offer a person of advanced age a chance to reform and begin his life anew (S v Zinn supra 541B-C).

 

Old age is regarded as a mitigating factor during the sentencing phase in various jurisdictions, including Zimbabwe, England, United States and Australia. The legal principles in this regard are almost identical.[1] As the Australian courts have also recognized, “The significance of old age as a mitigatory factor, particularly when combined with ill health, is that it constitutes a basis on which the court, in the exercise of mercy, may impose a sentence significantly shorter than otherwise might be the case” (S v Henderson [2005] WASCA 89 par 23; and S v Tasmania [2007] 173 A Crim R 492 par 13, quoting from Smith v The Queen (unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, WA, Library No 940285, 2 June 1994)). The basis for the principle is compassion and mercy (S v Tasmania supra par 13).

 

In Zimbabwe the courts have known to go further as it has been noted that the courts would rather err on the side of leniency when sentencing an elder (Feltoe 124). The relevance of mitigation increases with old age especially if it is combined with another mitigating factor such as poor health and a shortened life expectancy.

 

The parole board is not a sentencing judge but is placed in exactly the same position when exercising the vast statutory powers and when considering whether old age is one of the bases for granting medical parole. In R v Hunter (1984) 36 SASR 101, King CJ said at 103: "A sentencing judge cannot overlook the fact that each year of a sentence represents a substantial portion of the period of life which is left to [the offender]."

 

With regard to deterring the elderly from offending, there is generally no need for such deterrence as there are very few potential offenders. In Australia maturity alone may be mitigating depending on the circumstances of the case, as long as it does not downgrade the seriousness of the offence to the detriment of the general deterrence objective (S v Braham (1994) 116 FLR 38 43). The argument is that to imprison an elderly person for retributive purposes would be pointless and the concept of special deterrence would be irrelevant (Fox and Freiburg par 11.408). The court cannot overlook the fact that each year of the sentence represents a substantial portion of the period of life left to the offender (S v Tasmania supra par 14 with reference to R v Hunter (1984) 36 SASR 101 103.

 

Old age is of special importance when deciding whether the offender should be imprisoned, as the effects of prison are especially harsh on the elderly, difficult to adjust to or tolerate. Imprisonment for the elderly raises certain practical problems for the prison services. Three issues should be noted: it is more costly to incarcerate the elderly, mainly as a result of increased health problems, victimisation.

 

Despite their overly harsh stance against criminal accused, United States courts have routinely taken old age into consideration even in serious criminal offences where heavy sentences are mandatory. In United States v. Collins, 122 F.3d at 1307, the defendant was sixty-four (64) years old, and suffered from “heart disease, high blood pressure, ulcers, arthritis and prostatitis.”  In light of Collins’s “old age and ill health,” the court sentenced him to forty months of incarceration for distribution of cocaine rather than the one hundred and fifty-one to one hundred and eighty-eight months recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines.  In United States v. Hildebrand, 152 F.3d 756(8th Cir. 1998) overruled in part by Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209 (2005), the court sentenced the seventy year old defendant to five years of probation with six months in a community correctional facility for mail fraud and money laundering in lieu of the fifty-one to sixty-three months recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines.  The court did so even though “the Bureau of Prisons could manage Zucker’s [the defendant’s] conditions.”  Id.  In United States v. Jackson, 14 F. Supp.2d 1315, 1316 (N.D. Ga. 1998), the court sentenced the seventy-six year old defendant to eighteen months of imprisonment for eighty-three counts of mail fraud rather than the thirty-three to forty-one months recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines. The defendant suffered from severe osteo-arthritis, a torn rotator cup, and chest pains.  14 F. Supp. 2d at 1318-1319.  Even though the court recognized the Bureau of Prisons would be able to accommodate the defendant’s needs, 14 F.Supp. 2d 1315 at 1321, it concluded that the “combination of ailments” justified the departure.  14 F.Supp. 2d 1315 at 1322.  In United States v. Barbato, No. 00 CR 1028, 2002, WL 31556376(SDNY Nov. 15, 2002)(unpublished), the eighty-one year old defendant suffered “from a variety of serious medical ailments, including hypertension, carotid artery disease and coronary artery disease.” Instead of sentencing the defendant to the twenty-four to thirty months the Guidelines had recommended for his loan sharking conviction, the court sentenced the defendant to twelve months of home confinement and two years of supervised release. The court justified the departure because of the defendant’s “medical condition and his advanced age.” Id.  In United States v. Willis,322 F. Supp. 2d 76, 78 (D. Mass. June 23, 2004), the court sentenced the sixty-nine year old defendant to probation with six months of home detention for income tax offenses.  The court imposed that sentence rather than the twenty-one to twenty-seven months recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 78, after, in part, considering the cost of home detention versus jail:

 

The issue is one of degree. Willis has an inordinate number of potentially serious medical conditions. It seems imminently logical the Willis is at an age where these medical conditions will invariably get worse. It seems logical that being away from his support structure, both family and doctors, will invariably exacerbate his conditions. It seems logical that were he to go to jail for three years between the ages of 69 and 71 that he will emerge in substantially worse shape than he is now, if he does not die before completing his sentence. It seems logical that while the BOP can care for him, the costs of that care are bound to escalate. Finally, it seems logical that his conditions at least put him in the zone that enables me to balance the cost of home detention vs. jail, whether home confinement will be "equally efficient as and less costly than incarceration," U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1, or whether "home detention may be as efficient as, and less costly than, prison" as it is described in U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4

322 F. Supp. 2d at 84-85.

 

It is a source of consternation for most people that the issues of Mr. Zuma’s health and advanced age were never canvassed by the apex Court during his sentencing even though they were part of the record submitted by the Zondo Commission. The factors of Mr. Zuma’s liberation war service, his long and productive life, his age, his health difficulties, and his election for two terms as President of the Republic and ANC President are all part of the history and characteristics of the defendant that must be considered.  These are, of course, to be balanced against the circumstances of the offense.  In Mr. Zuma’s case, the Commission’s Act stipulates a sentence of no more than six months.  But the Constitutional Court disregarded the statute and invented its own unique sentence simply because it was dealing with Jacob Zuma.

 

There was no unanimous finding by all justices that imprisonment was proper sentence for his alleged contempt of court.  Nonetheless, the circumstances of especially Mr. Zuma’s health and age call for careful practical consideration and should carry great weight. There are a number of decisions where courts have given notably less weight to the Sentencing Guidelines in recognition of the fact that older individuals, some as young as 40, are less likely to commit additional crimes. In United State v. Testerman, No. 1:06CR00004, 2006 WL 2513018(W.D.Va. Aug. 31, 2006), the 79 year old defendant received three years of probation with four months of home detention rather than the twenty-seven to thirty-three months the Guidelines recommended for his charge of dealing in firearms. The court found that the sentence would “adequately deter” the defendant and others, in part, because of the defendant’s  advanced age [and]his previous law-abiding life.”.

 

In considering the age of the defendant, several courts have gone beyond simply the issue of recidivism.  Those courts recognize that elderly individuals such as Mr. Zuma are reaching the end of their lives and that a prison sentence of significant length has a much greater impact than it would on a younger individual.  See United States v. Willis, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 83 (“a given sentence may be uniquely disproportionate to the elderly offender; elder criminals will lose a greater percentage of their lives than younger criminals and may suffer more from the same sentence”); and United States v. Jackson, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 1322 (“While the court is unable to predict defendant’s life expectancy, based on his age and various infirmities it is clear that a thirty-three months sentence is more onerous for Paradies than for most defendants.  In reality, the defendant’s thirty-three months sentence may turn out to a life sentence.”).

 

Right-thinking people, as opposed to the racist bigots of the DA, would take into account that in other countries, even older life sentenced prisoners are strong candidates for benevolent release policies such as geriatric release (age dependent) or compassionate release (based on ill health).   In some countries for example in Russia, Ukraine and Romania, the authorities limit the imposition of life imprisonment on individuals over a certain age (65 years old).  In other jurisdictions, such as Spain and France, the authorities ensure that elderly life-sentenced prisoners have the possibility of leaving prison by making them eligible for parole when they reach a certain age – in both cases 70 years old.  It is in keeping with our own constitutional norms, including Ubuntu, to be compassionate towards elderly prisoners who pose no security threat or harm to society in general.

 

Since the Constitutional Court judgment in S v Makwanyane, ubuntu has become an integral part of the constitutional values and principles that inform interpretation of the Bill of Rights and other areas of law. In particular, a restorative justice theme has become evident in the jurisprudence that encompasses customary law, eviction, defamation, and criminal law matters. We must consider these concepts in the context of the fundamental constitutional values of dignity, fairness and reconciliation and reaffirm the values of restorative justice.  It would be incongruous to assert that “ubuntu” is relevant in the criminal law sphere in matters involving whether a convicted murderer should receive the death penalty (Makwanyane) but at the same time treat the age of the offender as irrelevant.  Ukuhlonipha abantu abadala” is deeply embedded in our culture as Africans and is part of Ubuntu. 

 

In Zuma’s case, a sentence of 15 months is far greater than necessary to serve the interests of sentencing outlined in the Commissions Act itself.  Mr. Zuma’s conduct, his  personal characteristics and accomplishments,  and  the  humiliation  and  ostracism  he  has  already  experienced  during  the  ordeal demonstrate  that  a  full pardon was warranted. But the cowardly President Ramaphosa cannot be expected to exercise leadership and grant pardon to Zuma without offending his Stellenbosch Svengalis.   For partisan and factional reasons he chose to keep the octogenarian President Zuma incarcerated in this dangerous period of uncontrolled covid-19 infections and in the face of his documented health problems.  This amounts to playing Russian roulette and a dangerous gamble with both President Zuma’s life and this country’s stability and social cohesion.

 

Our country needs robust and decisive leadership capable of rekindling the hopes of many South Africans yearning to build a capable state within an appropriate ethical framework and the required competent and incorruptible judiciary. It must be leadership untethered to Stellenbosch and unencumbered by financial shenanigans requiring sealing by the judiciary.  The ANC has been given the mandate by our people to exercise the vast powers it has under the Constitution and to lead the charge towards a developmental state that is going to develop the economy, create jobs and improve the conditions of society standard of living through proper corruption-free government.  That remains an elusive forlorn hope as long as we have a President who cannot make a decision without seeking the approval or endorsement of white apartheid relics, imperialists and neo-colonialists. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



[1] The basic rule is that advanced age can be regarded as a mitigatory factor when sentencing an offender (Zimbabwe: Feltoe A Guide to Sentencing in Zimbabwe (1990) 123 with reference to Kambarami HS-13- 82; and see also S v Banana [1999] JOL 4730 (ZH); England: R v John Francis C [1993] 14 Cr App R (S) 562; R v Fontes [2006] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 76 par 13; R v Rahmi [2002] EWCA Crim 928 par 6; Thomas Principles of Sentencing (1979) 196 and the cases referred to; Walker Sentencing. Theory, Law and Practice (1985) 51; Ashworth Sentencing and Criminal Justice (2005) 176; Australia: S v Tasmania [2007] 173 A Crim R 492; R v Wacyk (1996) 66 SASR 530 537; Daunton-Fear Sentencing in South Australia (1980) 66; and Fox and Freiberg Sentencing: State and Federal Law in Victoria (1985) par 11.408).

Monday, August 9, 2021

ZUMA’S UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT - A BREACH OF SOUTH AFRICA'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW

 

ZUMA’S UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT -  A BREACH OF SOUTH AFRICA'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW

                                        By: Paul M. Ngobeni

International human rights law in general places obligations on states like South Africa in relation to all people, not only citizens. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), (Proclaimed and adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 217A(III), December 10, 1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), (adopted by U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entered into force March 23, 1976) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (adopted by U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entered into force January 2, 1976.)-- together known as the "international bill of human rights" because they form the foundation of international human rights law--confer the great majority of the rights they enumerate to "everyone." Clearly that includes former President Zuma as the Concourt appears to recognize.

 

On 6 August 2021the Constitutional Court’s issued additional directives to the parties in the Zuma rescission application.  The Court asked the parties in the Zuma contempt case to make submissions on two issues. First is “whether this Court is obliged to consider the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) when construing Sections 12(1)(b) and 35(3) of the Constitution. Second, is if it should, “what implications do articles 9 and 14(5) of the Covenant together with decisions of the Human Rights Committee have on the applicant’s detention?”

The directives further raise extremely disturbing questions about the Court’s implicit admission that it acted in violation of both our Constitution and international law when adjudicating the Zuma matter.

 

For starters, more than three years ago, I wrote an article entitled “Justice for President Zuma - SA Natives Forum Lawsuit, Friday, April 6, 2018

https://constitutionalcrossroads.blogspot.com/2018/04/justice-for-president-zuma-sa-natives.html . In the context of discussing the applicability of international law and foreign law in human rights interpretation I stated as follows:

 

The Constitution’s provisions of section 35(3) (d), "the right to a speedy trial", can best be understood in the context of international law and foreign law in South African criminal procedure. Section 39 of the Constitution reads as follow: When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum- (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom;  (b) must consider international law; (c) and may consider foreign law.

Clearly, section 39 of the Constitution makes it peremptory for South African courts to consider international law and no judge may ignore that willy-nilly. Further, Section 233 of the constitution instructs the courts’ about the proper role of international law in South African national law under the Constitution. It states: ”When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.

It is very important to remember that the right to a trial within a reasonable time frame has been guaranteed in various international law instruments. South Africa has signed and ratified various international treaties and covenants, enacting them into national law through Parliament.  The provisions of international and regional instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights article 9(3) which state that "anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to be released” are legally binding on our courts and judicial officers.  So are the provisions of the he African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights article 7(1) (d) which stipulates that "every individual shall have the right to have a trial within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal.”

Decisions of foreign courts are instructive in regard to the Zuma case.  Our Bill of Rights and constitution are modeled along the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

 

It is mandatory to consider international law whenever a court assumes the duty to interpret the Bill of Rights.  Clearly, the fact that the apex court committed such a glaring elementary error in the initial conviction and sentencing of former President Zuma gives further credence to the notion that there is Zuma exceptionalism in the interpretation and enforcement of our laws when it comes to Mr. Zuma and his rights. Section 39 of the Constitution should have been a no-brainer to the judges - this provision codifies the interpretation rules relevant for the interpretation of the South African Bill of Rights. The wording of subsections 39 (b) and (c) suggests a difference in approach to international and foreign law. In the case of international law the court must consider it, and in the case of foreign law the courts may consider it. Though there is a clear difference between the two auxiliary verbs "may" and "must", both of them are linked with the verb "consider", which has a variety of meanings such as to "think carefully about (something)"; to "regard (someone or something) as having a specified quality"; to "take something into account when making a judgement"; and to "look attentively at".[1]  The Constitutional Court judges knew that the Constitution imposed that duty on them at every stage where the interpretation of the Bill of Rights is involved.  But in Zuma’s case they threw all caution to the wind and arrived at a grossly unjust verdict which sent a citizen to direct imprisonment based on motion proceedings and without the benefit of a criminal trial.  There are simple answers to the questions the judges have now posed almost a month after Zuma was incarcerated.

 

The answer to the Concourt’s first questions lies in the abecedarian reality that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is a multilateral treaty adopted by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) on 16 December 1966, and in force from 23 March 1976 in accordance with Article 49 of the covenant.  It is part of international law and South Africa is also a signatory to the Covenant. The covenant commits its parties to respect the civil (liberty and security of person) and political rights of individuals, including the right to life, freedom and security of person, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, electoral rights and rights to due process and a fair trial. The ICCPR is part of the International Bill of Human Rights, along with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). So the answer to the Court’s question is in the affirmative and is clearly spelled out in the Constitution.

 

Our Constitution makes it mandatory, when  interpreting the Bill of Rights, that “a court, tribunal or forum- (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom;  (b) must consider international law; (c) and may consider foreign law. Clearly, section 39 of the Constitution makes it peremptory for South African courts to consider international law and no judge may ignore that willy-nilly.  The Constitutional clearly erred in its ruling regarding Mr. Zuma – it claimed that it was dealing with an unprecedented or unique but it never at any point considered foreign law where hundreds of cases dealing with punitive incarceration for alleged contempt have been decided.  It clearly violated the Constitution’s provisions that it “must consider international law.

 

Further, although the Court specifically limits its inquiry to whether it is “obliged to consider the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) when construing Sections 12(1)(b) and 35(3) of the Constitution” Mr. Zuma’s rights provided by these provisions are considerably wider than the Court’s conservative approach. Section 12 of our Constitution is entitled “Freedom and security of the person” states as follows:

12. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes the right—

(a) not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause;

(b) not to be detained without trial;

(c) to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources;

 (d) not to be tortured in any way; and

(e) not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way.

 

Based on the express language of the Constitution, it is crystal clear that the provision regarding rights not to be detained without trial  was flagrantly violated.  Arguably, the other provisions such as the not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause and the not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way were all implicated.  Our country is in clear violation of both its constitutional and covenant obligations in regard to the manner in which it treated former President Zuma and caused him to be detained and punished without any fair trial.  But there is even more astounding violation of Mr. Zuma’s rights under Section 35(3) which guarantees a full panoply of fair trial rights.  It provides as follows:

 

35 (3) Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right—

(a) to be informed of the charge with sufficient detail to answer it;

(b) to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence;

(c) to a public trial before an ordinary court;

(d) to have their trial begin and conclude without unreasonable delay;

(e) to be present when being tried;

(f ) to choose, and be represented by, a legal practitioner, and to be informed of this right promptly;

(g) to have a legal practitioner assigned to the accused person by the state and at state expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of this right promptly;

(h) to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during the proceedings;

(i) to adduce and challenge evidence;

(j) not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence;

(k) to be tried in a language that the accused person understands or, if that is not practicable, to have the proceedings interpreted in that language;

(l) not to be convicted for an act or omission that was not an offence under either national or international law at the time it was committed or omitted;

(m) not to be tried for an offence in respect of an act or omission for which that person has previously been either acquitted or convicted;

(n) to the benefit of the least severe of the prescribed punishments if the prescribed punishment for the offence has been changed between the time that the offence was committed and the time of sentencing; and

                         (o) of appeal to, or review by, a higher court.

 

I would not attempt to analyze in detail how Mr. Zuma’s rights to a fair trial were violated as it would be pointless and futile – there was no trial of any kind whatsoever.  Accordingly the violation was complete and absolute.

 

The second question is framed in very interesting and tantalizing form in that it asks “what implications do articles 9 and 14(5) of the Covenant together with decisions of the Human Rights Committee have on the applicant’s detention?”  The answer is unambiguously clear as well. Article 9 of the ICCPR recognises the rights to liberty and security of the person. It prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, requires any deprivation of liberty to be according to law,[Article 9.1] and obliges parties to allow those deprived of their liberty to challenge their imprisonment through the courts.[Article 9.4]. Articles 9.3 and 9.4 impose procedural safeguards around arrest, requiring anyone arrested to be promptly informed of the charges against them, and to be brought promptly before a judge.

 

Article 14, like Section 35(3) of South Africa’s constitution contains extensive protections of the accused’s rights to a fair trial. Article 14 recognizes and protects a right to justice and a fair trial. Article 14.1 establishes the ground rules: everyone must be equal before the courts, and any hearing must take place in open court before a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, with any judgment or ruling made public.[Id.]. These obligations apply to both criminal and civil hearings, and to all courts and tribunals.

 

Further, article 14 imposes specific and detailed obligations around the process of criminal trials in order to protect the rights of the accused and the right to a fair trial. Just like our own Constitution, Article 14.2 establishes the Presumption of innocence and forbids double jeopardy. It requires that those convicted of a crime be allowed to appeal to a higher tribunal,[Art.14.5] and requires victims of a Miscarriage of justice to be compensated.[14.6]. It establishes rights to a speedy trial, to counsel, against self-incrimination, and for the accused to be present and call and examine witnesses.[Art.14.3]. 

 

All of these rights were denied to President Zuma. As the minority judgment observed, the right to equality was denied.  I have previously observed that:

“It is lamentable that, instead of a legally sound and scholarly judgment, the majority judgment displays all the hallmarks of a political tract verdant with emotion-laden heated rhetoric long on denunciation of President Zuma but woefully short on legal principles and consideration of justice. Not surprisingly, and giving credence to the adage that “a guilty conscience needs no accuser,” the majority starts off with a defensive jeremiad that: “To the extent that the second judgment insinuates that I am creating precedent to punish Mr Zuma alone,57 my Sister is mistaken. I do no more than apply the law, cautiously, to these new and unusual circumstances.” Truth be told, they did exactly that selective persecution and worse – they created a precedent to punish Zuma alone by claiming “unusual circumstances” and then proceeded to find him guilty of a crime and imposed upon him a 15 month jail sentence without a trial.  Lest we forget, under Apartheid, Zuma had the benefit of a trial before he was convicted and sentenced to ten years on Robben Island.  And yet under the new democratic constitution he sacrificed so much for, he has been sentenced to a determinate jail sentence without the benefit of a trial!  See, Shameful Contempt Verdict Against Zuma-Why the Public Was Robbed of Justice? Saturday, July 3, 2021     https://constitutionalcrossroads.blogspot.com/2021/07/shameful-contempt-verdict-against-zuma.html

 

 As the dissenting justices point out, the majority has imposed punitive incarceration on Zuma, departed from the established principle that a court must not adjudicate a matter in which a member of the same court is a litigant and has violated Section 165 of the Constitution by presiding over a case in which the majority judges complain that Zuma has vilified, attacked, insulted and slandered them. That the majority euphemistically characterizes this flagrant violation of established  constitutional principles as mere application of the law, cautiously, to these new and unusual circumstances” is truly astounding and tragic. A case of selective persecution clearly exists. Members of the public have the right to protest vehemently and vociferously against such actions by any branch of our government.

 

In conclusion, had the Court considered the provisions of Section 39 that it “may consider foreign law” it would have realize that its entire judgment against Zuma was unconstitutional and unlawful. It would have paid attention to the admonition of the US Supreme Court in Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. at 621 explaining that “criminal penalties may not be imposed on someone who has not been afforded the Protections that the Constitution requires of such criminal proceedings”. It would have been alive to the principle that the presiding judge is required to make a “conscientious effort” to ensure that the contemnor is not subjected to further civil confinement in the absence of an ongoing and realistic possibility of coercing compliance. Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1983). It would have been conscious of the fact that the use of the summary contempt power should only be exercised after considering the following words of the Supreme Court: “Summary punishment always, and rightfully, is regarded with disfavor and, if imposed in passion or pettiness, brings discredit to a court as certainly as the conduct it penalizes.” Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 8 (1952).  Ironically, it is not Zuma’s words or alleged conduct that will bring the Concourt into disrepute but the Court’s own angry judgment which was “imposed in passion or pettiness.” Most importantly, it would have been solicitous of Zuma’s right to be tried by an unbiased judge in a public trial, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); and would have recognized Zuma’s right to a “disinterested prosecutor.” Notice that in Zuma’s case there was no disinterested prosecutor – the Court relied on the submissions of the Zondo Commission in the Motion proceedings.

 

In Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925) US Chief Justice Taft uttered some cautionary words to guide trial judges in the use of their contempt powers.

“The power of contempt which a judge must have and exercise in protecting the due and orderly administration of justice and in maintaining the authority and dignity of the court is most important and indispensable. But its exercise is a delicate one and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions. This rule of caution is more mandatory where the contempt charged has in it the element of personal criticism or attack upon the judge. The judge must banish the slightest personal impulse to reprisal, but he should not bend backward and injure the authority of the court by too great leniency. The substitution of another judge would avoid either tendency but it is not always possible. Of course where acts of contempt are palpably aggravated by a personal attack upon the judge in order to drive the judge out of the case for ulterior reasons, the scheme should not be permitted to succeed. But attempts of this kind are rare. All of such cases, however, present difficult questions for the judge. All we can say upon the whole matter is that where conditions do not make it impracticable, or where the delay may not injure public or private right, a judge called upon to act in a case of contempt by personal attack upon him, may, without flinching from his duty, properly ask that one of his fellow judges take his place. Cornish v. The United States, 299 Fed. 283, 285; Toledo Company v. The United States, 237 Fed. 986, 988. The case before us is one in which the issue between the judge and the parties had come to involve marked personal feeling that did not make for an impartial and calm judicial consideration and conclusion, as the statement of the proceedings abundantly shows.”

 

President Zuma did not have an impartial court and a disinterested prosecutor required for criminal contempt prosecution. In Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 793–801 (1987) the US Supreme Court, invoking its supervisory power, instructed the lower federal courts first to request the United States Attorney to prosecute a criminal contempt and only if refused should they appoint a private lawyer. Id. at 801–802. Still using its supervisory power, the Court held that the district court had erred in appointing counsel for a party that was the beneficiary of the court order; disinterested counsel had to be appointed. Id. at 802–08. Justice Scalia contended that the power to prosecute is not comprehended within Article III judicial power and that federal judges had no power, inherent or otherwise, to initiate a prosecution for contempt or to appoint counsel to pursue it. Id. at 815.  Advocate Ngcukaitobi was acting for the Zondo Commission and had no legal standing to prosecute Mr. Zuma for alleged contempt.  As the dissenting justices correctly suggested, the matter should have been referred to the NPA for prosecution.  Instead, the justices acted as prosecutors and judges at the same time.

 

Our judiciary is in a big crisis. Justice Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court observed: “‘Judges as persons, or courts as institutions, are entitled to no greater immunity from criticism than other persons or institutions. Just because the holders of judicial office are identified with the interests of justice they may forget their common human frailties and fallibilities. There have sometimes been martinets upon the bench as there have also been pompous wielders of authority who have used the paraphernalia of power in support of what they called their dignity. Therefore judges must be kept mindful of their limitations and of their ultimate public responsibility by a vigorous stream of criticism expressed with candor however blunt.”

 

The latest blunder from the Concourt proves that our judges are human and may commit mistakes and blunders. Either a rescission application as Mr. Zuma did or vigilant, vibrant public criticism, dignified and responsible, should correct judicial wrongs. With large powers and a considerable level of immunity, judges are apt to turn noxious and culpable at times. Generally our judges strive to maintain a high order of conduct but sometimes aberrations do happen. Therefore, relentless but measured criticism becomes necessary in a democracy.  As  Hugo Black, a former judge of the U.S Supreme Court, observed: “Judges are not essentially different from other government officials. Fortunately they remain human even after assuming their judicial duties. Like all the rest of mankind they may be affected from time to time by pride and passion, by pettiness and bruised feelings, by improper understanding or by excessive zeal.  In the Zuma case, the judges must swallow their pride, rescind the unjust judgment, offer an apology and release Zuma from prison.

 

Does President Zuma Have A Right to Effective Remedy in the Form of Compensation?

 

The numerous international human rights instruments discussed herein recognise the right to an effective remedy for a human rights violation.[1] In other words, a victim of a human rights violation is legally entitled to pursue and obtain an effective remedy. International human rights treaties provide a remedy, both substantive and procedural, for individuals suffering injury from unlawful conduct by State authorities. In addition to the right to an effective remedy for human rights violations, human rights treaties as well as some domestic constitutions, provide for specific provisions for compensation, as in the case of unlawful detention. For example, Sect. 14(5) of the Constitution of Ghana, 1992 provides that a "person who is unlawfully arrested, restricted or detained by any other person shall be entitled to compensation from that other person". Likewise Article 75The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) authorises the Court to determine any damage, loss or injury to victims and order reparations to them.

 

The same United Nations Commission on Human Rights (referred to by the Concourt in the Zuma matter) gave recognition to the interests of victims of human rights violations by adopting the "Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law". The aim of this instrument is to provide victims of violations (of both human rights and international humanitarian law) with a right to a remedy. State Parties are required to adopt various measures (including legislative and judicial) aimed at achieving the respect, protection and promotion of the rights contained therein. Article 2(2) of the ICCPR obliges States Parties to "take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant [the ICCPR], to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant [ICCPR]." This entails, amongst other things, ensuring that a victim of a human rights violation can and should have his or her cause heard by an independent, impartial, and duly constituted court, tribunal or forum.

 

That Zuma must be freed from jail is an obvious remedy but we must consider the substantive content of the right to an effective remedy as stipulated in the ICCPR, and articulated by the HRC which has construed this as follows:

 

Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that in addition to effective protection of Covenant rights States Parties must ensure that individuals also have accessible and effective remedies to vindicate those rights. Such remedies should be appropriately adapted so as to take account of the special vulnerability of certain categories of person, including in particular children. The Committee attaches importance to States Parties' establishing appropriate judicial and administrative mechanisms for addressing claims of rights violations under domestic law. The Committee notes that the enjoyment of the rights recognized under the Covenant can be effectively assured by the judiciary in many different ways, including direct applicability of the Covenant, application of comparable constitutional or other provisions of law, or the interpretive effect of the Covenant in the application of national law. Administrative mechanisms are particularly required to give effect to the general obligation to investigate allegations of violations promptly, thoroughly and effectively through independent and impartial bodies. National human rights institutions, endowed with appropriate powers, can contribute to this end. A failure by a State Party to investigate allegations of violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant. Cessation of an ongoing violation is an essential element of the right to an effective remedy.

 

…Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that States Parties make reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated. Without reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated, the obligation to provide an effective remedy, which is central to the efficacy of article 2, paragraph 3, is not discharged. In addition to the explicit reparation required by articles 9, paragraph 5, and 14, paragraph 6, the Committee considers that the Covenant generally entails appropriate compensation. The Committee notes that, where appropriate, reparation can involve restitution, rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction, such as public apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition and changes in relevant laws and practices, as well as bringing to justice the perpetrators of human rights violations.

United Nations Human Rights Committee Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant (2004).

 

Compensation and an apology are the only means of avoiding a prolonged and nasty JSC judicial misconduct complaint against the Constitutional court judges for abuse of their contempt powers.  We all hope the judges will do the right thing.



[1] See the definition of "consider" in the Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford University Press 2015 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com).